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Introduction:
An Alternative is Possible
On 27 February 1989, hundreds of thousands of Caraquenians, residents of the
Venezuelan Capital of Caracas, took to the streets to protest the economic policies of then
President Carlos Andrés Perez. These protests were in response to a series of economic
reforms called El Gran Viraje (The Great Turnaround) that Perez implemented to soften the
effects of economic contraction and crisis that had plagued Venezuela throughout the 1980s.
These policies included a slashing of social services, the privatization of social security,
increases in gas prices, and the elimination of various subsidies.1 After a decade of falling
wages, the deterioration in standards of living, and the firing of state employees, Venezuelans
became fed up with IMF-imposed structural adjustment and shock treatment policies and
decided to take to the streets. During the ensuing week, people protested, barricaded
buildings, created roadblocks on major transportation routes, destroyed shops, rioted, and
looted. This widespread unrest quickly spread to other Venezuelan cities. In response to the
protests and rioting, President Perez suspended constitutional guarantees and deployed
approximately 10,000 soldiers into various Caracas neighborhoods to control the looting.2
Between 300 and 2,000 people lost their lives during the government repression, additional
thousands were wounded, and thousands of businesses and homes were destroyed.3 The
event has since been referred to as the Caracazo.
The Caracazo was one of the first of what would be countless violent social
movements that caused widespread unrest throughout South America during the 1990s and
2000s. The large majority of these protests were responses to the implementation of
neoliberal economic and political policies during this time period. Between the late 1970s
and the present day, every country in the world, from the United States to Papua New Guinea
1

has experienced some sort of neoliberal economic reform. These reforms, which will be
discussed in depth later, stressed the ideals of free market economics and emphasized a
noninterventionist central state. These policies were enacted worldwide primarily because of
the success it brought to wealthy nations, the elite class, and large corporations. Extensive
privatization, market liberalization, and austerity measures opened developing countries’
economies up to foreign investment. These policies led to a high degree of macroeconomic
growth for the developing countries and huge profits for international investors. However,
they were often enacted rapidly and uniformly around the world, and domestic actors and
institutions in many countries were inadequately prepared for the rapid inflow of foreign
capital and resources.
Neoliberalism created vast riches for a select few and abject poverty for the majority
in most developing countries, especially in South America. However, because there was the
appearance of macroeconomic growth and those in power were often benefitting from the
free market reforms, neoliberalism continued and strengthened throughout the 1990s. Along
with widespread poverty, high rates of unemployment, low wages, and a lack of access to
social services, neoliberalism also produced a number of executives who attempted to
circumvent democratic processes in order to enact unpopular reforms. Since many of the
neoliberal reforms were against the interests of the majority, many presidents found ways to
implement their reforms through non-democratic processes, such as decrees and executive
orders. They have also attempted to reduce the power of the opposition in the legislative and
judicial branches. Some of these tactics include the weakening of political parties and labor
unions and the creation of laws that permit executives to stack national courts with
sympathetic judges. This combination of socioeconomic and political exclusionary policies
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formed the grievances of the popular sector and prevented these people from using formal
political channels to demand reform. Due to these policies, members of the popular sector
around the world took to the streets to protest neoliberalism, as they saw it as their only way
to voice their grievances and force change.
This project will examine the various social movements that arose in South America
out of this neoliberal context. South America has been chosen over different regions of the
world for various reasons. For one, the first national neoliberal reforms in the world were
implemented in Chile under the rule of General Augusto Pinochet. Although Chile was the
first, many other neighboring countries quickly modeled their economic programs after Chile
following the rapid economic stabilization the country was able to achieve. In the matter of
just a few years, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay, and Brazil all had
experienced the best and worst aspects of neoliberalism. Unlike other regions of the world,
South America experienced acute neoliberal policies for nearly a quarter of a century while
Asia and Africa was not exposed to the ideology until the late 1980s and early 1990s.4 Along
with its duration, the implementation of neoliberal policies in South America has been
particularly intense for a variety of reasons, including the severity of the Latin American debt
crisis on these countries in the early 1980s. Therefore, South America has experienced the
longest and most intense period of neoliberalism in the world.5 South America is also the
region of with the most number of national anti-neoliberal protests during the 1990s and
2000s. Although social movements against neoliberalism, the World Bank, the IMF, the
WTO, and other manifestations of the neoliberal ideology took place around the world, they
were nowhere near as frequent or effective as they were in South America.6 National antineoliberal social movements caused the resignation, overthrow, or electoral defeat of
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multiple heads of state in a number of different South American countries. Moreover, their
existence or the threat of their return forced presidents to either listen to their demands or risk
facing widespread political and social instability. Examples of these powerful and successful
social movements can be found in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, among others.
These social movements helped install a number of left-leaning presidents who were willing
to challenge the neoliberal ideology and its powerful economic institutions, something that
few people had attempted to do. Since being elected, these presidents have abandoned
neoliberalism for a more humane form of capitalism. Therefore, it is important to understand
how these movements arose and why they were so successful.
The Argument
In examining six South American countries, I explain why national anti-neoliberal
social movements were able to oust neoliberal politicians in favor of more nationalist and
socialist ones in certain countries and unable to do so in others during the 1990s and early
2000s. In Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, these kinds of social movements were
widespread and generally successful in accomplishing these goals. However, in Chile and
Peru, national social movements largely did not occur during this time period. I argue that
four factors are essential in understanding how these movements arose and why they were so
successful in certain countries but did not exist in other countries. Drawing on a variety of
social movement theories and the unique historical context of each country and of South
America as a whole, I identify four factors: a history of strong national populism, the
existence of neoliberal-induced socioeconomic and political exclusionary policies, economic
crises that exacerbated these exclusionary policies and weakened the power and appeal of the
neoliberal government, and the ability of social movement organizers to frame their
4

grievances in a national context and form horizontal linkages with each other to attract
supporters of all classes and identities. Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela
experienced all four of these factors to a certain degree while Peru and Chile did not
experience one or more of these requisites.
Organization
This thesis will be organized into four chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter
will trace the history of neoliberalism and attempt to explain how it went from being a theory
developed by elites in the backrooms of Davos, Switzerland to a global ideology that has
affected every human being in the world over the past 35 years. It will also examine why the
creators chose South America as neoliberalism’s first experiment and why neoliberalism was
so prevalent and intense during that time period.
The second chapter will review the major social movement theories of the 20th and
21st centuries and attempt to apply those theories to the South American context. Social
movement theory, also known as contentious politics, became a popular field of study in the
1970s in the wake of the number of social movements that spread around the world in the
late 1960s. This field of study combines aspects of economics, political science, psychology,
and sociology to explain when and why people will engage in collective action. In this
chapter I first outline the idea of collective action and then review the prevailing theories of
social movements. These theories are: relative deprivation, resource mobilization, political
process/political opportunity, and the new social movement model. I then apply these
theories to the unique South American neoliberal context and outline the four factors that led
to the formation and success of social movements in South America during the neoliberal era.
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The third and the fourth chapters are the case studies in which I analyze the four
factors as they relate to six South American countries. In the third chapter, I examine
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela and attempt to explain the role of the four
factors in the formation and success of social movements in these countries. All four
countries featured heads of state who used various political policies to enact a series of
comprehensive neoliberal structural adjustment reforms without the consent of the people. In
the wake of these policies, people took to the streets to express their grievances with the
government because they often saw it as their only opportunity to have their voices heard.
However, in each case, these movements were neither sporadic nor unorganized. Social
movement organizers – such as labor unions, community organizations, popular assemblies,
and indigenous movements – were essential in framing the people’s issues in a national
context and coordinating with each other to get all people from all walks of life to support
their causes. In each country, national social movements helped cause the resignation,
overthrow, or electoral defeat of various neoliberal politicians.
The fourth chapter analyzes why Chile and Peru did not experience national social
movements similar to those in the other countries examined. Both of these countries border at
least two of the countries covered in Chapter Three and underwent many similar neoliberal
policies. However, unlike other South American countries, Chile and Peru suffered through
dictatorships during the neoliberal era. Authoritarianism made it easier for Pinochet (Chile)
and Alberto Fujimori (Peru) to implement controversial or unpopular policies without the
threat of political opposition. Moreover, under the guise of national security, these two
dictators effectively closed all political associational space and prevented social movement
actors from organizing collective action. The legacy of violence and terror that these two
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leaders left behind, combined with the high degree of socioeconomic and political
inclusionary policies of the governments that followed the dictators, largely prevented the
formation of national social movements after the return of democracy. Although
neoliberalism continued after the return to democracy, most people did not take to the streets
to voice their grievances because of a fear of a return to violence, the improvement in the
relationship between the government and the people, and the implementation of a number of
social policies that dampened the most extreme effects of neoliberalism.
In the conclusion, I review how the main argument manifested itself in the case
studies and also briefly look into the successes and failures of current anti-neoliberal
presidents. In the four countries that experienced successful social movements, the living
standards of the popular sector drastically improved in the wake of the election of presidents
willing to resist both neoliberalism and the economic hegemony of the United States and the
IMF. In each of these countries, an anti-neoliberal president has yet to resign, be overthrown,
or defeated electorally. In Argentina, Nestor Kirchner was elected in 2003 and then his wife,
Cristina Fernandez was elected in 2007. In Bolivia and Ecuador, respectively, Evo Morales
was elected in 2005 and Rafael Correa in 2006 and both have ruled since. Hugo Chavez was
elected president of Venezuela in 1999 and served in that capacity until his death in March
2013. Although each of these presidents faced ongoing criticism from external actors and
domestic elites and occasional collective action against their policies, they have also all
experienced high levels of public approval, especially among the popular sector. While
poverty, unemployment, low wages, and economic inequality are still common, the leaders of
these countries appreciate the ability of the popular sector to cause widespread political and
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social instability and have realized that their jobs and lives are in jeopardy if they do not
represent the interests of the masses.
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Flores-Macias 2012, 97. For more information on Caracazo see Silva (2009).
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Chapter 1
Neoliberalism: From Davos to Santiago to Global Ideology
On February 22, 2012, a commuter train transporting thousands of passengers from
the suburbs of Buenos Aires to the downtown area crashed and killed 49 people and gravely
wounded nearly 700 others.1 During the height of morning rush hour, the thousands of people
were jockeying for position to quickly get to work when the train hurtled at a high rate of
speed into the Once Station in the geographic center of the city. In the wake of the disaster,
the government was accused of forcing the private company that operated the trains, Trenes
de Buenos Aires (TBA), to charge fees that were too low to keep the trains operational and
safe. Others blamed the driver for inadequately operating the train. However, after a thorough
investigation of the disaster, officials determined that a brake failure on the nearly 40-yearold train was the primary cause of the crash.2 The investigation also uncovered that TBA had
received a $2 billion contract in 2008 to put into operation 25 new trains, yet only four had
been installed as of the crash.3 Those few new trains were only installed on TBA’s other
major commuter line that serviced the wealthier suburbs of the city. Although there were
other influences, the major cause of this horrific accident was that a privately owned
company in charge of a typically public utility had put profit over all else and the government
was inadequately prepared to regulate safety conditions. Unfortunately, fatal train accidents
have been all too common in Argentina’s recent history. In 2011 alone, there were four fatal
train accidents in the city of Buenos Aires, three of which involved TBA.
Despite this multitude of mass transit catastrophes, Argentina had a UN Human
Development Index (UNHDI) score of .797 and its economy had grown by about 9%,
according to the World Bank during 2011.4 Many influential economists and political
scientists, such as Thomas Friedman (1999), and Joseph Stiglitz (2003), and Kathryn Sikkink
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(2011) often regard Argentina as one of the most developed and democratic countries in
South America and one of the strongest defenders of human rights in the world. A dichotomy
therefore exists: praise from foreign governments and economic institutions for high degrees
of economic development and growth, juxtaposed with increasing degrees of inequality, a
decreasing state capacity to provide for or protect its citizens, and an increasing sense of
resentment among the majority of the people toward their government from the neoliberal
state that dominated much of South America during the 1980s and 1990s and is still very
apparent in the modern day.
The International Economy in the Postwar World
Neoliberal policies were not implemented on a national scale until the late 1970s. The
theory was first articulated in the mid 1940s when a group of elite, western-educated,
capitalists decided to develop an economic and political theory that would avoid another
Great Depression, World War, and global instability. However, due to postwar posterity in
the United States and the astronomical investments flowing into Western Europe, policies
encouraging a more active central government were much more prominent in the immediate
postwar period. It was not until these activist state policies began to stall national economies
that governments and society began to question the role of a strong central government.
Neoliberalism, an ideology composed of various economic and political theories that stress
the importance of the fundamentals of capitalism and a fairly weak or noninterventionist
central government, had finally found its opportunity to be implemented in national policies
around the world. While a few advanced industrialized economies, such as Great Britain and
the United States, adopted a few minor neoliberal policies, elite economists and politicians
throughout the Western world decided to implement the first experimental neoliberal policies
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in Latin America, specifically Chile and Argentina. Since its implementation in the late
1970s, it has proven to be one of the most destructive forces throughout the entire developing
world, but especially in Latin America. In this chapter, I will critically analyze how
neoliberalism became a global ideology, to which every country has had to either conform or
face serious consequences, and how the neoliberal framework has robbed many developing
countries of their ability to provide for and protect their citizens.
In 1945, the worst economic depression and the most violent armed conflict in history
had left politicians and economists trying to recover from the ashes of war and return to a
sense of normalcy. During this time, the prevailing economic theory was that the state should
play an active role in ensuring that economic and political institutions were rebuilt. This
theory was a more modern version of Keynesianism, an economic-political theory developed
during the Great Depression that stressed an active government in the economy, especially
during crises. It stressed that the state should focus on “full employment, economic growth,
and the welfare of its citizens, and that state power should be freely deployed, alongside of or,
if necessary, intervening in or even substituting for market processes to achieve these ends.”5
In the postwar world, embedded liberalism replaced Keynesianism, a term first coined by
John Ruggie (1982).6 This theory stressed the desire to balance free international trade with a
state strong enough to encourage certain private sector activities while restraining the more
dangerous ones. The Bretton Woods System implemented many of these embedded
liberalism policies, most notably the formation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank. These two international economic institutions were created to ensure global
economic stability and help countries reconstruct their economic and political infrastructure
after a severe crisis.7 Under embedded liberalism, the state had the responsibility of ensuring
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economy stability; if it did not have the power or the resources to do so, these international
organizations would use funds from other members to stabilize the country and prevent
another worldwide crisis.
Embedded liberalism led to unprecedented economic growth throughout the United
States and Western Europe throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, primarily because of the
postwar prosperity in the United States and the enormous amount of American investment in
Western Europe under the auspices of the Marshall Plan. In less than two decades, Western
European countries had rebuilt much of the infrastructure destroyed during the war, were
fully functioning democracies, and the threat of another war on the European continent had
drastically decreased. All of these accomplishments were achieved with a fairly strong
central regulatory state that controlled many key sectors, such as coal, steel, and
transportation.8 One of the main reasons for this unprecedented level of growth was the
ability of the United States to run incredibly large deficits because the BWS pegged the
dollar to the gold standard and then all other currencies to the dollar. However, by the 1970s,
the economies of the United States and Western Europe began to stagnate. Inflation and
unemployment rose drastically and increases in social expenditure due to an increasing need
for welfare spending exacerbated these fiscal crises. In the wake of the first worldwide
recession since the Great Depression, politicians and citizens called for reform.
Neoliberalism had found its opportunity.
An Alternative Ideology
Throughout the postwar era of embedded liberalism and the BWS, economic elites
prepared neoliberalism so that it could be implemented at the first sign of weakness of the
state interventionist model. Instead of stressing the importance of the role of the state in
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helping to prevent the worst economic crises, the neoliberals believed that an overly active
state was the fundamental cause of such crises. These economists and political experts,
including Frederich Von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and Milton Friedman, stressed the
importance of the ideals of personal freedom and that the “…hidden hand of the market was
the best device for mobilizing even the basest of human instincts.”9
To neoliberals, the freedom of the invisible hand was sacred and inviolable and,
therefore, they were diametrically opposed to any form of government intervention in the
market or any form of centralized state planning.10 The main role of the state should be to
ensure the freedom of its citizens to enjoy access to the free market through the protection of
private property and individual freedoms with a strong security state. Environmental
regulations, support of labor organizing, trade restrictions, high income taxes, banking
regulations, and state-run industries were all seen as disadvantageous and threatening. Along
with being a political and economic ideology, neoliberalism also featured a moralistic view
of the individual within society. Neoliberals asserted that individual human freedom and
dignity were “…the bases for democracy, against the threat of fascism, communism, and
other kinds of state control…”11 and that freedom is “…best realized through free market
activity and private property rights.”12 It was obvious from the beginning that the architects
of neoliberalism did not intend for the theory to be solely a new economic model to bring
states back to their capitalist roots to avoid further crisis; they wanted this theory to be a new
way of governance and a new way to control the global economy.
Although neoliberalism started out as primarily an economic theory, it has proven to
have drastic political consequences for the states that have been forced to adopt it. Despite
the fact that a group of western educated elites crafted the theory, it could not just simply
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replace the embedded liberalism of the United States and Western Europe. Although the
United States and Great Britain implemented some minor, almost covert, neoliberal policies
in the mid 1970s, these changes cannot be considered major ideological reforms. An example
of these covert neoliberal policies came during the 1975 New York City fiscal crisis.
Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, many American urban areas were facing severe
economic crises due to industrialization and suburbanization. Where it used to be that only
upper class citizens could afford to live in the downtown areas of large cities, poorer and
working class citizens began to settle in America’s inner cities. The initial solution was a
large amount of federal funding and the expansion of public employment under President
Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” program, a textbook embedded liberal response. However,
in the early 1970s when the worst effects of stagflation were beginning, President Richard
Nixon decided that there were not sufficient federal resources for this program and simply
declared the crisis over.13 With this lack of federal funding, New Yorkers had to resort to
private financial institutions for funding. Once these actors were in charge of the money that
was flowing into the city, the composition of the city budget drastically changed and focused
primarily on “essential services”14. The federal government’s economic maneuvering proved
to have drastic social and political consequences. Unions lost a significant amount of power,
public workers either lost their jobs or had their wages froze, and social provisions for health
care, education, and transport were slashed.15 Crime increased, the city became much dirtier,
and “…city business was increasingly conducted behind closed doors, and the democratic
and representational content of local governance diminished.”16 The response of Nixon and
the private financial institutions to the New York fiscal crisis did not even amount to a formal
neoliberal process, yet it set the stage for how neoliberalism would be implemented in the
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real world. Unfortunately for many Latin American countries, the first neoliberal
“experiments” were formal economic and social policies implemented by powerful
international actors, by force if necessary, on a national scale.
Why Latin America?
Neoliberals chose Latin America as the region to first implement their theory on a
national scale for many reasons, including the region’s geographic proximity to the US, a
strong allegiance with Latin American elites, and an abundance of key natural resources.
During the 1970s, the spread of communism to Latin America was still a legitimate threat
and the United States was dedicated to making sure that Cuba would be the only communist
country in the Western Hemisphere. Throughout the Cold War, the US would use any
economic, military, political, and intelligence resources at its disposal to ensure that the
USSR could not establish another base in the Americas. Guatemala, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Brazil, El Salvador all experienced the power of the United States’ military or the
CIA even before neoliberalism gained prominence. However, as embedded liberalism spread
to Latin America and more “leftist” politicians came to prominence in the region, the United
States could no longer simply just overthrow popular leaders with suspected Marxist
tendencies. They needed a way to reform the economic, political, and social structures to
ensure that the politicians and the people would always choose capitalism over communism.
Neoliberalism was the solution. It would ensure that the economies of the region would
remain dependent on the US but also create the sense of economic growth and development
and, therefore, curtail the power of Marxist and populist movements.
The richness of natural resources throughout Latin America is another reason why
neoliberals looked to the region to implement their first policies. Not only was Latin America
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in a politically strategic position, it was also crucial to the economic well being of many
powerful American multinational corporations. For example, Chile is the world’s top
producer of copper. Throughout the industrialization and militarization of the United States
in the 20th century, copper was one of the most valuable resources in the world. The high
demand for copper made Chile an important country for US economic and business interests.
Copper made Chile’s economy almost entirely dependent on the export sector, a common
theme throughout Latin America. In the 1960s, two American firms, Anaconda and
Kennecott, controlled about 80% of Chile’s copper mines and accounted for 50% of Chile’s
exports and 20% of its government revenues.17 The investments of these companies greatly
benefitted Chile’s upper and upper middle class but impeded the Chilean economy from truly
developing or industrializing. Due to the control of Anaconda and Kennecott over the
Chilean economy, they essentially bought off politicians with high salaries and large amounts
of land. In exchange, the Chilean elites and politicians ensured that costs would remain low
in the form of low wages or lax safety standards. Chile’s dependence on copper and foreign
corporations made its economy incredibly vulnerable to international economic fluctuations.
Because the foreign corporations encouraged copper mining over other forms of economic
production, Chile’s economy was overly specialized. The elites were making such lucrative
profits from copper that they did not worry about strengthening their overall economy or
increasing the quality of life of their fellow citizens. For example, although elites owned
large tracts of fertile land, they saw no need to cultivate or utilize it and Chile was a net
importer of foodstuffs, even though it had the potential to feed its people.18
Copper’s role in Chile was eerily similar to soy’s role in Argentina, iron’s role in
Brazil, and natural gas’ role in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. American corporations
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could reap huge profits, American consumers could purchase the cheap natural resources,
and political elites in these countries could stay in power or acquire large amounts of wealth
and land. Neoliberalism’s ideals of keeping the state out of the market, reducing trade
barriers, and encouraging capital inflows reinforced the benefits of export-led growth for
American multinational corporations and Latin American elites. However, the neoliberal era
was different than this previous era of US-Latin American relations because of the way
neoliberalism was sold to the public. Although neoliberalism was still largely implemented
by force in its first stages in Latin America, the citizens of these countries initially embraced
it because of its ability to produce rapid initial growth and because of its appeals to individual
freedom. During the 1960s and 1970s, social movements pushing for social justice and
individual freedoms against interventionist governments and powerful corporations were
rampant all around the world. According to Harvey (2005), “By capturing the ideals of
individual freedom and turning them against the interventionist and regulatory practices of
the state, capitalist class interests could hope to protect and even restore their position.”19
Prior to neoliberalism, the US government and corporations were content with forcing a
certain political ideology on Latin America. If they encountered any resistance, they would
simply silence the protest movement or government in power and install one that would
represent their interests. However, this tactic was no longer sustainable in the 1970s due to
worldwide negative perceptions of big government and big corporations. Therefore, to ensure
that they could have the same access to Latin American natural resources and maintain their
political influence in the region, they had to build some sort of consent. This consent was
built through appeals to individual freedom and economic growth.
Neoliberalism’s First Victim
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The first instance of neoliberalism in Latin America came in Chile directly after the
US-supported coup of Salvador Allende, a democratically elected socialist. Allende won the
1970 election with only about 40% of the popular vote but his victory was an enormous
threat to the US because of the fear that he would nationalize key industries or grow closer to
the Soviet bloc. Therefore, both the Chilean upper class and the CIA constantly tried to
undermine Allende’s policies. Eventually, these attempts culminated in General Augusto
Pinochet’s violent coup and the murder of Allende. Once Pinochet took office, he appointed
a number of economists trained at the University of Chicago to transform the Chilean
economy and society. These “Chicago Boys” were trained by one of neoliberalism’s
founders, Milton Friedman. Although Pinochet had a monopoly on the legitimate use of force
and was not particularly concerned about political freedoms, he still wanted to legitimate his
regime. According to Carlos Huneeus:
The military regime sought another kind of legitimacy based on economic
success, proposing an ambitious program of radical reforms whose purpose
was to overcome the serious crisis inherited from the Popular Unity
government. This was intended to produce an economic boom based on a new
institutional foundation: a market-based economy and a new relationship
between state and society. The market-based economy and the newly
conceived relationship were intended to eradicate poverty and achieve
development, but also to serve as the basis for the new political system.20
Pinochet’s initial tactic was proliferating constant propaganda comparing his economy to that
of Allende. In essence, Allende’s government represented a failure of democracy and
Pinochet’s military government was necessary to the founding of a new Chilean Republic.
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The increased power of the armed forces and police was to ensure a smooth transition to this
new Republic. In one of Pinochet’s first speeches as president, he said, “The government of
the armed forces and police aspires to begin a new phase in the national destiny, opening the
way to a new generation of Chileans formed in a school of healthy civic habits.”21 Notice the
appeals made to the ideas of a healthy democracy and true individual rights. Although the
actual situation in Chile under Pinochet was nowhere near these ideals of “healthy civic
habits”, these appeals to democratic freedoms have neoliberal roots.
Despite these appeals to democracy and individual freedom, the main way Pinochet
developed support for his economic and social policies was through economic success.
Carlos Huneeus identifies Pinochet’s Chile as a “developmentalist dictatorship” that
employed the Prussian model of development in which rapid industrialization policies were
implemented in an authoritarian context.22 Without any democratic limitations, Pinochet
enacted economic reforms with little to no resistance. These reforms were initially successful,
in part because of the dire state of the economy at the time of Allende’s murder, but also
because of the temporary benefits associated with the shock doctrine of neoliberalism. Many
of these reforms would go on to be standard neoliberal policies. This economic plan, called
“The Brick”, involved the reduction of trade barriers, liberalization of financial markets,
deregulation, privatization, a reformation of the balance of payment system, and the drastic
weakening of union powers.23 In the first few years of these policies, “Growth rates were
high and unemployment was low. Inflation declined, boosting the income of formal sector
employees, and capital inflows boomed, thus strengthening the balance of payments and
helping the central bank increase its reserves.”24 A dictator had enacted the first national
neoliberal reforms in history and Chile’s economy was growing. The upper and business
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classes were flourishing and were willing to sacrifice political freedoms in exchange for
economic success. The global neoliberal project was underway.
Along with this ability to rapidly enact economic reforms, Pinochet’s absolute power
also enabled him to control the media and manipulate Chileans into thinking that they were
better off under an authoritarian regime than a democratically elected government. Because
elites who greatly benefited from these neoliberal policies controlled the media, Pinochet and
the Chicago Boys “…enjoyed the full support of the media, which worked to report on these
initiatives in a positive light, hiding weaknesses and ignoring criticism from some business
and opposition circles.”25 This positive media portrayal and the ability to quickly silence any
potential opposition led to Pinochet’s victory in a 1980 plebiscite that granted him a new
presidential period of eight years. To this day, many Chileans still hold Pinochet in a high
regard because of his ability to save the country from the economic and political catastrophe
of socialism.
However, these successes only outline a minor aspect of Chilean neoliberalism and
completely ignore the rampant human rights violations, drastic cuts in social services, high
unemployment, increasing poverty, and environmental degradation. Neoliberalism was
designed to favor the upper classes at the expense of the middle and lower classes. In order to
benefit the elites and employers, the Chicago Boys drastically curtailed the power of both
workers’ and student unions to prevent the formation of any strong opposition. Anyone who
tried to form a strong workers’ union or join an anti-government student union was usually
fired, imprisoned, tortures, and killed.26 With no workers’ unions and few regulations,
businesses could ignore safety conditions, force long hours, and pay incredibly low wages.
Moreover, the lack of regulations meant that businesses could ignore the environmental
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impact of the extraction of natural resources. Many of these natural resources were finite and
the process of mining them was taxing on the environment. This environmental degradation
adversely affected all Chileans, but especially those of the lower and working classes who
depended on the land for survival. Rapid and extensive privatization robbed the central
government of valuable revenue. This revenue was once used to provide social services in
the form of healthcare, public housing, and public education. With no revenue, these services
were cut and the people who were generally net recipients of social services, the working
class, suffered tremendously. These are just some of the negative aspects of neoliberalism.
The arbitrary detention, torture, and murder of tens of thousands of Chileans
throughout Pinochet’s regime should not go unnoticed. Many of the other South American
countries experienced similar violent, military or authoritarian regimes during this time in a
campaign that is now known as Operation Condor. The 1970s and early 1980s is now known
as the “lost decade” in South America because of these brutal dictatorships in Chile,
Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador. However, the goal of this
chapter is to argue that the Chilean neoliberal model was designed to be exported around the
world. Although neoliberalism may have enabled these authoritarian regimes, the theory’s
architects did not necessarily intend to utilize the same amount of violence in its
implementation in other countries. The relationship between neoliberalism and these regimes
in South America is no minor connection, further investigated in the coming chapters.
However, the derogation of workers’ rights, increasing unemployment and poverty,
environmental degradation, decreasing democratic capacities, and a slashing of social
services have proven to be common themes in the neoliberal state largely because of the
“economic successes” of Chile.
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Globalization and the Modern Neoliberal State
The successes of Chile led neoliberals to implement similar policies around the world,
from the United States and Great Britain to Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Although each country has had its own unique experiences with these policies, an increase in
income inequalities, a decline in the ability for the government to provide social services to
its people, and a growing dependence on foreign aid or international economic institutions
are all characteristics of the modern neoliberal state. Neoliberalism was first implemented in
Chile thanks to a US supported coup. However, neoliberals realized that they could not
violently overthrow every functioning government in the developing world. Instead, starting
in the 1980s, they turned to international economic institutions to force neoliberalism onto
these countries. Up until this time, the IMF was a Keynesian organization dedicated to giving
aid to countries in order to prevent global instability. They would give funds to governments
to stimulate demand and help the country spend out of its crisis. However, in the 1980s, the
IMF succumbed to the free market ideology of Reagan and Thatcher and began to enact
policies that severely limited the power of the government and rapidly liberalized a country’s
economy in exchange for aid.27 Many of these policies were neoliberal in nature and made
these countries entirely dependent on international aid to survive. These policies became
known as the Washington Consensus and included imposing fiscal austerity, privatization,
and market liberalization. Although these policies were often well-intentioned and
appropriate responses to countries with inefficient governments and huge fiscal deficits, they
were often implemented rapidly and in a cookie-cutter model that did not take into account
the unique situations of each economy.28 This rapid implementation often overwhelmed the
country’s economy and the citizens were the ones who suffered the most. Unemployment and
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poverty increased, wages dropped, the middle class eroded, and crime skyrocketed.
According to Stiglitz, “…the Washington Consensus has all too often been to benefit the few
at the expense of the many, the well-off at the expense of the poor. In many cases
commercial interests and values have superseded concern for the environment, democracy,
human rights, and social justice.”29 Not only had neoliberalism come to dominate the
national economies and governments of many Latin American countries, it had also come to
dominate the international economic system and became a standard response to any
developing country.
Although the US largely controls IMF policy because it is its largest supplier of funds,
the IMF has still sought some form of consent from the aid receiving country as a
legitimation strategy. This consent has often involved some coercion, but it is important to
note that many developing countries have accepted this aid willingly. Unfortunately,
willingly often meant that governments would rather impose these strict policies on their
economies instead of losing out on the aid. Accepting IMF aid was the only way to survive.
“The IMF’s view was simple: questions, particularly when raised vociferously and openly,
would be viewed as a challenge to the inviolate orthodoxy. If accepted they might even
undermine its authority and credibility. Government leaders knew this and took the cue.”30
Argentina in the late 1980s, Ethiopia and Botswana in the early 1980s, and the East Asian
Tigers in the late 1990s all either had to accept the conditions of IMF aid or be shut out of the
international economy. Unfortunately, the IMF conditions often exacerbated the adverse
economic conditions and robbed the national governments of the ability to provide basic
services for their people.
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The combination of the new IMF ideology and the increasingly globalized economy
meant that neoliberalism could now penetrate every aspect of all societies and become a truly
global ideology that defined the international economic system for much of the 1980s, 1990s,
and 2000s. Thomas Friedman defines globalization as “the inexorable integration of markets,
nation-states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed before – in a way that is enabling
individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper,
and cheaper than ever before…”31 In essence, globalization is the worldwide spread of
neoliberalism. Countries can either adopt these policies or risk losing funding from
international organizations, losing investment from foreign corporations, and having their
currency destroyed by wary currency speculators. In this modern system, governments can
experience unprecedented amounts of economic growth and development in a short amount
of time, such as Argentina in the 1990s. However, they can also experience crippling
economic crises that lead to social and political unrest, such as the peso crisis in Mexico in
the mid 1990s or the Argentine economic crisis in 2000. In the modern world, national
governments can no longer control their economies. Instead, international economic
institutions, multinational corporations, and finance and currency speculators determine a
country’s economic and political fate. In South America during this time, the people realized
the incapacities of their governments to challenge the international system and decided to
find alternative ways to fight for their economic, social, and political rights. Due to these
governmental incapacities, the history of success of social movements in forcing profound
reforms in the region, and the profoundly negative effects the neoliberal ideology had on the
popular sector, the people turned to the streets and non-governmental organizations to make
sure that their countries integrated into the international community at their own pace and
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according to their own unique conditions. In the next chapter, I will critically review the
major social movement theories to better understand these instances of mass mobilization in
South America. Although they appear chaotic and sporadic, these movements were often
highly organized and massive in numbers, largely because of the devastatingly negative
exclusionary policies that neoliberalism produced.
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Chapter 2
Theorizing the Revolution: A Review of Social Movement Theory
To examine the social movements that have arisen in South America in response to
neoliberal policies, an analysis of the major social movement and collective action theories is
necessary. Although these neoliberal protests have been unique, the second half of the 20th
century has witnessed an unprecedented number of social movements that have caused major
instability and produced political reforms around the world. According to Charles Tilly
(1978), a social movement is “…a deliberate collective endeavor to promote change in any
direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal into
‘utopian community’…” and it must “…evince a minimal degree of organization."1 Social
movements have existed for thousands of years but the combination of a high frequency of
violent and substantive mass movements with a boom in sociological studies in the second
half of the 20th century helped create the new field of social movement politics, or
contentious politics. Scholars in this field attempt to explain how mass social movements
form and which kinds have had the most significant impact. A number of these theories
incorporate psychological, economic, political, and historical concepts to not only explain
past social movements, but also to predict the occurrence and effectiveness of future
movements through the identification of certain key variables. Some of the major social
movement theories include the classical, or relative deprivation, theory, the resource
mobilization theory, the political process/opportunity theory, and the new social movement
theory. This chapter will outline the key aspects of each theory and assess which may be
most effective for analyzing the social movements in South America over the past two
decades.
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Collective Action
At its core, a social movement is a manifestation of collective action that does not
necessarily have any affiliation with a state government. Since the majority of social
movements analyzed in this work began outside of the state’s control, a brief analysis of
collective action theory is necessary before examining the major social movement theories.
Neil Smelser (1963) identifies six elements that are necessary for any kind of collective
action. According to his value added theory, these six elements are structural conduciveness,
structural strain, generalized belief, precipitating factors, mobilization for action, and the
failure of social control.2 Structural conduciveness refers to how the structure of a society can
either inhibit or promote the likelihood of mass social action. People are generally aware of
these structures and act accordingly. If a society is structurally conducive, then a structural
strain can prompt a panic that leads to collective action. A structural strain can be mass
inequality or injustice, a financial crisis, or other societal problems that those in power
choose not to or cannot change. According to Smelser, “…the combination of conduciveness
and strain, not the separate existence of either, that radically reduces the range of possibilities
of behavior other than panic.”3 Along with these structural conditions, the growth and spread
of a common belief system is also necessary. This belief makes the movement meaningful to
potential actors by identifying “…the source of strain, [attributing] certain characteristics to
this source, and [specifying] certain responses to the strain as possible or appropriate.”4 The
fourth component needed for collective action within a panic is a series of precipitating
factors. These factors often determine the likelihood of a strain causing a panic and can
contribute to the formation of a generalized belief system. Once these previous four
components have been established, the mobilization of participants for action, the fifth
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component, brings the group into action and can transform collective behavior into a riot, a
protest, or a revolution. The final component, the operation of social control, determines
whether the other components materialize and, if so, how successful they can be. Social
control can take the form of police, military, the courts, the press, religious institutions, or
community leaders.5 These actors can minimize the conduciveness and strain, or prevent a
panic involving collective behavior. They can also be mobilized after the commencement of
collective action and be essential in determining how the movement will be controlled or
embraced. Smelser argues that these six components are all interrelated and interdependent in
the formation and existence of social movements. Although future social movement scholars
have crafted a variety of theories to explain different social movements, many of these
components are fundamental pillars of these newer theories.
Tilly (1978) identifies five major components of collective action: interest,
organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action.6 These five components
acknowledge some of Smelser’s contributions but also build on his arguments. The interests
are the gains and losses resulting from a movement’s interaction with other groups. The
organization is how a group is structured that enables or disables it from advancing its
interests. Mobilization refers not only to how a group can recruit members, but also how it
goes about gaining control over the resources it needs to advance its interests. These
processes include exercising labor power, goods, weapons, votes, and other forms of
coercion.7 Opportunity is one of the most important components and determines when a
group may act. The relationship between the group and the outside world can either threaten
or encourage the group’s interests. This relationship is essential in understanding when a
group may act. The fifth component, collective action itself, is a result of a changing
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combination of these four components.8 Similar to Smelser’s arguments, all of the
components are interrelated and interdependent but a slight change in just one can often
produce a mass social movement. With this theoretical background in collective action, an
examination of the major social movement theories of the past half-century and their relation
to the social movements of South America in response to neoliberal policies is possible.
Relative Deprivation
Relative deprivation is one of the oldest social movement theories and its main
architects include James Davies (1962, 1974), Smelser (1962), and Muller and Seligson
(1987). This theory stresses that social movements and collective political violence are
products of the widening gap between what people want and what people actually receive.
When people feel that they have been relatively deprived, they are more likely to commit
collective violence. According to Davies (1962), “Revolutions are most likely to occur when
a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short
period of sharp reversal.”9 Instead of simply being a product of inequality, poverty, or
injustices, collective violence is most likely to occur when people think they deserve more
than they are receiving. Impoverished and corrupt nations do not often experience much
collective social violence because the people have not experienced any sort of growth or
development. Many of the people in these nations must expend the majority of their energy
just to survive and generally do not look to collectively challenge those in power. Along with
this drastic drop in living conditions, wages, or political rights after a period of economic
and/or social prosperity, the relative deprivation theory is dependent on the masses being able
to assign responsibility on an institution, generally the government, for the suffering. “The
crucial factor is the vague or specific fear that ground gained over a long period of time will
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be quickly lost. This fear…generates when the existing government suppresses or is blamed
for suppressing such opportunity.”10 This theory is largely psychological in nature and is
dependent on people’s life expectations and views on national stability. Although this theory
was first articulated in the early 1960s, it has been used to explain many historical and
contemporary social movements.
Scholars have used the relative deprivation theory to explain a variety of social
movements, including Dorr’s Rebellion of 1852, the Paris Uprising of 1871, and the Russian
Revolution of 1917.11 In Dorr’s Rebellion, industrial workers and farmers organized a social
movement against the Rhode Island state government after the state refused to extend
suffrage rights to all adult males. The surrounding states of Massachusetts and Connecticut
had already extended voting rights to all adult males. A sharp economic depression in the
1830s after periods of post-war and industrial revolution prosperity combined with this lack
of political rights to prompt workers and farmers to create their own constitution and hold
their own elections for state officials. The Rhode Island state government considered these
actions treason and eventually violence broke out between the two groups that lasted for
about a month.12 According to relative deprivation scholars, this movement occurred because
a sharp decline in economic and social prosperity followed a long period of relative stability.
When Rhode Islanders realized that there was a gap between what they were receiving and
what they were expecting to receive, they rebelled. Similar gaps between expectations and
actual living standards can be seen as the cause of the Paris Uprisings in 1871. After periods
of economic and social development throughout the 19th century, the French defeat in the
Franco-Prussian War in 1870 adversely affected many Parisians because of the German siege
of the city. Moreover, once the war ended, the French national assembly severely restricted
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the rights of all Parisians, including former soldiers.13 Once again, a sharp social crisis
followed a prolonged period of economic and social development and because the masses
felt relatively deprived, they decided to commit collective violence.
Although scholars such as Davies, Smelser, and Tilly used the collective deprivation
theory to explain many historical and contemporary social movements throughout the 1960s
and 1970s, contentious politics scholars have mainly abandoned the theory in the modern day.
One of the major critiques of the theory is that it largely ignores the power dynamics
involved in every social movement. The theory asserts that when people’s expectations do
not match what they are receiving, they rebel. However, scholars often did not account for
the fact that these movements do not simply just occur when there is relative deprivation.
Some sort of organizational structure that can gather sufficient resources is also needed.
Moreover, this theory largely ignores the individual political contexts in which these
movements arose. It does not factor in alternatives to collective violence that might be
possible in unique political contexts and the idea that “Domestic political institutions and
power relations mediate collective responses to poverty and inequality.”14 Moreover, it is
often difficult to gauge the mood of a group of people before or during a social movement.
Although this theory may be applied to events that have already happened, it falls short of
providing a framework to anticipate future events. Nonetheless, the idea of a sharp crisis
following sustained development being an impetus for collective violence has been a
fundamental pillar for future social movement theorists. Moreover, the idea of relative
deprivation is particularly useful in the South American context. Throughout the 1990s,
neoliberalism allowed many South American countries to experience unprecedented amounts
of economic growth. However, this growth often manifested itself as tremendous
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development for the elites at the expense of the lower classes. Therefore, many people began
to realize the gap between their expectations and what they were receiving. Although the
relative deprivation theory can help explain some aspects of social movements, it is
insufficient as a comprehensive theory.
Resource Mobilization
Another social movement theory that gained prominence in the 1970s and is still
widely used today is the resource mobilization theory. This idea is originally an economic
concept but scholars such as McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Piven and Cloward (1977) have
applied it to collective action. Unlike the psychological basis of relative deprivation, resource
mobilization is based on political, economic, and sociological theories. It states that certain
resources must be mobilized in order to have a social movement, there must be links between
social movements and other groups inside and outside of the state apparatus, these
movements are often dependent on external actors for support, and that state authorities will
generally try to control or incorporate these movements through the mobilization of their
own resources. Although discontent with those in power or a feeling of relative deprivation
may be important in the formation of a desire for a social movement, access to resources is
key for mobilization. According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), “Social movements may or
may not be based upon the grievances of the presumed beneficiaries…in some cases
supporters – those who provide money, facilities, and even labor – may have no commitment
to the values that underlie specific movements.”15 Unlike the relative deprivation theory,
resource mobilization recognizes the complex relationships between the subjugated, the
leaders of the subjugated, and those who control the legitimate use of force. Organizers of
social movements must act according to the resources they possess. Sometime those
32

resources will promote conflict and collective violence, other times they will promote or
force reconciliation with those in power. “The concern with interaction between movements
and authorities is accepted, but it is also noted that social movement organizations have a
number of strategic tasks. These include mobilizing supporters, neutralizing and/or
transforming mass and elite publics into sympathizers, [and] achieving change in targets.”16
Social movement organizations are always looking for more resources and are trying to turn
nonadherents into adherents and adherents into constituents. Not only do resource
mobilization theorists want to explain why collective violence occurs, but they also want to
determine how they are operated. Another deviation from the relative deprivation theory is
that the resource mobilization perspective assumes that social movements constitute rational
behavior. According to Roberta Rice, “Instead of a collection of dissatisfied individuals,
social movements are viewed as collections of political actors dedicated to advancing
specific substantive goals.”17
Another crucial aspect of the resource mobilization theory is the importance of
external actors in the formation and proliferation of social movements. These external actors
may be wealthy investors looking for philanthropic ventures and have no real ties to the
issues surrounding the movement. Philanthropy is one reason why social movement
organizations actually benefit the most during times of economic prosperity, as people are
more likely to give money to charities and non-profit organizations during these times.18
These external actors can also be members of transnational non-governmental organizations
or international groups, such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and transnational
indigenous movements. These international organizations often have more resources and
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more political power than local social movement organizations and are valuable for gaining
both domestic and international recognition.
Although scholars have generally used resource mobilization to understand American
and Western European social movements (McCarthy and Zald 1977, Piven and Clowerd
1977, McAdam 1982, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996), the role of transnational actors
and organizations has permitted other scholars to apply the theory to the Latin American
context. Regional and international organizations have played a significant role in South
American politics for decades. For example, Sikkink (2011) outlines how crucial
transnational activist networks were to the arrest and prosecution of former members of
military governments in Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.
The arrest and attempted extradition of Augusto Pinochet would have been impossible
without the efforts of Chileans living in Europe, the Spanish government, and other
international human rights organizations. The arrest and prosecution of former Peruvian
President, Alberto Fujimori, would have been impossible without the Inter-American Court
for Human Rights. These examples illustrate the use of transnational actors in the process of
holding former military government members legally accountable for their actions. However,
regional and transnational organizations have also been influential in the formation of social
movements against neoliberalism. For example, Yashar (2005), Ballvé and Prashad (2006),
and Silva (2009) examine the significance of transnational community networks in the
formation and proliferations of religious and indigenous movements throughout Ecuador and
Peru in protest of neoliberal policies. The necessity of resources and external actors to the
formation and operation of social movements allows the resource mobilization model to be

34

applicable to the South American context, but it still ignores some of the most important
aspects of these recent mass protests.
Some of the main critiques of the resource mobilization theory include the
downplaying of unique political contexts, it underestimates local capacities and actors, makes
it easier for the powerful to coopt and corrupt social movements, and discounts the
importance of identity. Many resource mobilization theorists criticize the relative deprivation
model for ignoring the political context in which social movements are occurring. However,
the resource mobilization model also often ignores the unique political context of different
movements. The theory states that social movement organizations will collectively act when
there are sufficient resources to gain support and produce legitimate change. However, they
do not always realize that there are often other contributing factors. According to Rice,
“resource-mobilization theorists problematically assume a direct connection between
resource availability and insurrection.”19
Another common criticism of resource mobilization is that it downplays the
contributions and capacities of local actors and resources. According to Piven and Clowerd
(1977), the protest is the only recourse of the poor.20 The poor are the ones who generally put
the most effort into these movements and are usually the ones who have the most to lose or
gain. However, in an analysis of many of the workers and civil rights movements of the
1930s and 1960s in the United States, Piven and Clowerd determine that social movement
organizations often severely limited the movements. They state that mass defiance was
generally more effective than the political maneuvering of formal organizations, the
organizations often tried to soften the militancy of the movements (even if the militancy
gained concessions), and that the organizations generally dissolved once the movements
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ended.21 Therefore, support from external actors, especially elite actors, can often limit
instead of promote effective social movements. In Piven and Clowerd’s examples, local
actors using their own skills and resources can organize a successful social movement. The
success of local or indigenous groups without the help of outside actors is also apparent
throughout Latin American and Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the Movement of the
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) gained significant concessions from the Nigerian
government and the Shell Oil Company. Workers committing civil disobedience, students
occupying public spaces, and indigenous populations taking back stolen lands or organizing
mass roadblocks can often be just as effective as movements backed by social movement
organizations or international human rights organizations.
A disregard for the importance of identity in the formation of social movements and
social movement organizations is another issue that resource mobilization does not
effectively address. Although some scholars recognize the importance of transnational
organizations to the success of indigenous movements, the vast majority view social
movements as a clash between classes and do not take into account identity in the formation
of solidarity. With the growth of identity politics based on race, gender, ethnicity, and
people’s relation to the environment, social movement theorists have began to treat identity
as crucial to social movement formation. Although the resource mobilization theory provides
valuable insights into the necessity of resources from external actors in the formation and
operation of social movements, the theory is still insufficient to explain many of the
neoliberalism responses in South America because of its inability to account for unique
political context and the importance of identity politics.
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Political Process
In order to respond to the inability of the relative deprivation and resources
mobilization theories to recognize the importance of the unique political contexts of each
social movement, McAdam (1982), Tilly (1978), and McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996)
formed the political process model. This theory states that protest movements must
constantly interact with institutionalized politics and that certain political opportunity
structures either prohibit or enable the possibilities of collective action.22 These political
opportunity structures are the most crucial determinant of the formation of social movements.
According to McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996), there are four dimensions of a political
opportunity structure: the relative openness of the institutionalized political system, the
stability of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity, the presence of elite allies, and
the state’s capacity and propensity for repression.23 The emergence or repression of
collective action is based on changes in these four dimensions. If an institutionalized political
system becomes more open and more willing to represent the views of its constituents, the
chances of collective action outside of the political system are greatly diminished.
Conversely, if a political system becomes more closed or the state’s capacity or propensity
for repression increases, people are more likely to take to the streets to further their interests.
Tilly’s (1978) polity model is the best way of understanding the political process
theory. Society is composed of governments, members of a polity, and challengers.24 The
government and its members form a polity while the challengers are forced to operate outside
of that polity. Even though both members and challengers are seen as contenders with the
government, members can often access government resources with greater ease than the
challengers.25 Governments, members, and challengers all attempt to form coalitions to
37

further their interests. However, depending on various political opportunities and the
conduciveness of various institutions, sometimes these coalitions are impossible to form. If
there is no opportunity of coalition, a social movement or collective violence is highly
possible. According to Tilly’s model, opportunity has three distinct elements: power,
repression, and opportunity/threat.26 Power refers to the chances that an organization can
further its interests through interactions with other social movement organizations, members,
or the government itself. Repression is the cost of collective action and interacting with other
members of society. Facilitation is the opposite of repression where the interaction is positive
and lowers the group’s costs of collective action.27 Opportunity/threat refers to the extent to
which groups other than the challengers are either vulnerable or threatening to the challenger
furthering its interests. This model reveals the delicate relationship between challengers and
the government and how slight changes in these relationships can often determine the
likelihood of collective political violence.
Unlike the resource mobilization and relative deprivation models, the political
process theory recognizes the centrality of unique political contexts to the formation and
operation of social movements. Tarrow (1997) argues that these political opportunity
structures are best understood by the “dynamic statism” model. According to this model,
“entire political systems undergo changes which modify the environment of social actors
sufficiently to influence the initiation, forms, and outcomes of collective action.”28 Some
examples of these political changes include the end of a war, a regime change, or the
formation of a new constitution. Although this theory has been applied to changes in state or
national governments causing or impeding social movements, the growing importance of
international and supranational institutions has allowed scholars to apply the political
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resources theory in an international context. Changes in the policies or construction of
organizations such as the EU, the UN, or the IMF can also facilitate collective action.
Although the link between international political opportunity structures and the feasibility of
social movements will be examined in further chapters, the IMF has been very influential in
the determination of the openness of a political structure in South America, as has the EU in
its policies to Greece and Spain.
Despite the ability of the political process model to incorporate the importance of
different political contexts to the formation of social movements, it has been criticized for
being too state-centric and for discounting the importance of identity. Meyer (2004) argues
that the political process model often discounts the role of coalitions in favor of focusing
specifically on the openness of political institutions.29 This debate is basically between
scholars who believe that social movement actors are always trying to mobilize and are
unaware of the openness of political institutions and scholars who believe that social
movement actors are rational and highly aware of political opportunities and will only
mobilize when they think political institutions are particularly conducive to successful
movements. Meyer (2004) argues that although the openness of political institutions are often
essential to the formation of substantial movements, social movement organizers are
constantly framing their issues to gain support, regardless of the conduciveness of political
structures.30 Rice (2012) argues that shifts in political opportunity structures is not sufficient
to the formation of collective action, especially in the South American context, because this
emphasis on state-society relations is too Euro-centric.31 Moreover, identity is particularly
important in the South American context and the formation of social movement organizations
based on identities or common grievances can often form outside of the government’s control.
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New Social Movement Model
The New Social Movement Model (NSM) is the most contemporary social movement
model and has attempted for some of the deficiencies of the older models. Instead of
emphasizing psychological, economic, or political theories, this theory asserts that collective
action results primarily from structural changes in society.32 Another deviation from the
traditional social movement theories is that the NSM model states that contemporary social
movements are based more on identity and culture than class. Instead of the Marxist theory
that class struggle explains most social movements, NSM asserts that political and cultural
processes are essential. Moreover, social movements should be operated independently of
political institutions because the state is most likely to either destroy or corrupt the inner
workings of the movement. Instead, the movements must focus on attracting civil society to
bring about political change.33 The fact that these movements must operate independently of
political institutions and appeal to identities and culture instead of class oppression means
that the framing of the movement is particularly important to the NSM. Framing is the
process by which a social movement organization attempts to appeal to different members of
society. Sometimes, a movement is framed as only pertaining to one particular identity, such
as the MOSOP in the Niger Delta of Northern Nigeria. However, often mass social
movements attempt to appeal to multiple identities, as is the case in the majority of South
American social movements of 1990s and 2000s.
Zald (1996) outlines six components of framing and its role in the relationship
between movements and society. Those six components include: the cultural construction of
repertoires of contention and frames, the contribution of cultural contradictions and historical
events, framing as a strategic activity, the competitive processes in which frames are chosen
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and come to dominate, the role of the mass media, and the intersection of framing with
mobilization and political opportunity structures.34 These six components recognize the
importance of mass culture, the media, and propaganda and can determine the likelihood of
social movements occurring in different locations. Zald uses the different responses to the
nuclear accidents in Chernobyl and Three Mile Island to outline the importance of these
components and the applicability of the NSM.35 These two similar accidents produced very
different social responses because of differences in culture, relations between the media,
government, and citizens, and the role of the state in movements or countermovements. A
movement’s ability to appeal to particular historical events, multiple identities, cultural
traditions, and the media are often just as important as its ability to obtain resources, reveal
relative deprivation, or capitalize on changes in political opportunity structures.
Many scholars (Yashar 2005, Balvé and Prashad 2006, Silva 2009) have adopted the
NSM to explain contemporary social movements in Latin America largely because of the
number of indigenous or populist movements in the region. Many of these movements, such
as the indigenous movement in Ecuador and cacerolazo movements in Argentina, have
appealed to indigenous identities or a shared history of exploitation and subjugation by
foreign powers or corrupt governments.36 Since the goals of most movements have been to
disrupt or dismantle the existing state or economic apparatus, organizers are attempting to
work independently of the government to appeal to civil society without government
intrusion.
Two main critiques of the NSM are that they over-romanticize the abilities of social
movements to produce change and it fails to recognize the continuity between classical and
contemporary social movements.37 Asserting that social movements must appeal to common
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cultures and identities to enlighten the population of its subjugation at the hands of the
government ignores the very real necessity of acquiring resources and acting in unique
political contexts. However, social movements are not without costs and simply appealing to
common identities is rarely sufficient for the survival of a mass social movement. Moreover,
many contemporary social movement tactics, such as occupying public spaces, sabotaging
large corporations, and marches have been borrowed from historical social movements, such
as the Civil Rights Movement in the US in 1960s.
Figure 2.1: Social Movement Theories and Relation to Anti-Neoliberal Mobilization
Theory

Scholars

Causes of
Mobilization

Weaknesses

Relative
Deprivation

Davies (1962,
1974), Smelser
(1962), Muller and
Seligson (1987)

Ignores unique
political contexts,
overly
psychological

Resource
Mobilization

McCarthy and Zald
(1977), Piven and
Cloward (1977),
McAdam (1982)

Political
Opportunity

McAdam (1982),
Tilly (1978),
Meyer (2004),
Tarrow (1997)

New Social
Movement

Zald (1996), Rice
(2012), Yashar
(2005)

Prolonged period of
economic growth
and development
followed by sharp
economic crisis
Resources and
community
networks that
transcend class or
typical boundaries
must collaborate
based on common
grievances
Political
opportunity
structures permit or
prohibit the
probability of a
social movement
occurring
Collective action
results primarily
from structural
changes in society
and is largely based
on common
identities
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Anti-Neoliberal
Mobilization
Relation
History of
National
Populism

Ignores unique
political contexts,
underestimates
capacities of local
actors

Framing

State-centric,
ignores the
importance of
common identities
outside government
control

Socioeconomic
and Political
Exclusionary
Policies

Over-emphasizes
social movements
in producing
change, lack of
continuity between
classical and
modern social
movements

Framing

Conclusions and a Hybrid Model
This chapter has outlined some of the major social movement models of the past halfcentury. As social movements drastically increased in frequency in the 1960s, social
scientists created theories to explain collective action and how mass social movements could
produce drastic political and societal changes. Figure 2.1 outlines the major social movement
theories, the scholars associated with each theory, what causes social movements, the flaws
of each theory, and how that theory specifically relates to the South American anti-neoliberal
social movement context. The relative deprivation theory exerts that social movements are
most likely to occur when a sharp economic or societal crisis follows a prolonged period of
economic or political development. If people feel there is a gap between what they expect
and what they receive, they are more likely to commit collective violence. This theory is not
used as extensively in contemporary settings because it fails to recognize the importance of
resources and external actors or unique political contexts. The resource mobilization theory
was another common theory that developed in the 1970s. This theory states that the
formation and operation of social movements is dependent on social movement organizations’
ability to gather economic resources. These resources are necessary to gain the support of
external actors and to frame their argument in an effective manner. This theory has often
been criticized for its inability to recognize the importance of unique political contexts as it
states that the most important determinant of a social movement is the availability of
resources. The political process model has attempted to address this inability to recognize the
importance of political context. It states that the likelihood of success of a social movement is
dependent on various political opportunity structures. Changes in these structures make a
social movement either more or less likely to occur. These three theories have often
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encountered difficulties in explaining social movements in Latin America because of their
inability to account for cultural and identity politics. The New Social Movement Model has
attempted to address this deficiency by examining the importance of identities, historical
traditions, and how a movement may be framed in different cultures.
Although the NSM has been most widely used to analyze contemporary social
movements in South America, the availability of resources and the conduciveness of political
opportunity struggles cannot be ignored. As the following chapters will show, appealing to
indigenous and populist identities has been crucial for these social movements. However, the
role of social movement actors and the repression capacities of different state governments
have been just as crucial. Moreover, the social movements in response to neoliberalism have
presented a unique corollary to the political processes model. Typically, the political process
model refers to the political opportunity structures of either local or national governments.
However, since international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank have played
such a crucial role in the implementation of neoliberal policies, they have often acquired
capacities typically reserved for sovereign governments. Therefore, the political opportunity
structures within these organizations must also be taken into account. Given these different
factors, a hybrid model that accounts for the major themes covered in a number of major
social movement theory is necessary. Below is the model used in the analysis of the antineoliberal social movements in South America. This model includes aspects of the relative
deprivation, resource mobilization, political process, and new social movement models
because I argue that each of the theories examined above are necessary but insufficient to
explain why social movements occurred in certain countries but did not in others. I identify
these four factors as: a history of national populism, neoliberal-enacted socioeconomic and
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political exclusionary policies, economic crises that weaken both the appeal and the power of
the neoliberal state, and the framing ability of social movement actors.
History of National Populism
In the wake of the Great Depression, national populism as an economic and political
ideology spread throughout South America. After such a profound economic crisis, many
Latin American leaders believed that the state should have a stronger role in the economy to
avoid being so dependent on international actors or business interests. In many ways,
national populism was Latin America’s Keynesianism.38 One of the fundamental pillars of
national populism was import substitution industrialization (ISI), which created more stateled efforts to develop industry and infrastructure.39 ISI led to a much more powerful and
active state, as more people began to work for the state and state revenue increased
exponentially. This increase in state revenue enabled advancements in social services,
subsidies to basic goods, and sustained national growth rates. The development of urban and
rural labor rights, the strengthening of the welfare system, and a concern for rural and
peasant workers are also characteristics of the national populism movements. Essentially,
national populism was a form of capitalism designed to protect people from the unrestrained
market.40 Although there were many limitations to populism – such as the lack of democratic
rights, the favoring of the urban over the rural, and a lack of strong international economic
competitiveness – the advancement of the rights and the improvement in the quality of life
for members of the popular sector are its defining aspects.
In many ways, neoliberalism is almost the exact opposite of national populism. It
took the power away from the state and attempted to open South American markets to the
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unrestrained market and turned South American countries into market societies.41 The
popular sector, which had benefited so much from populism, was now the most marginalized
group in society. Therefore, if a country has a strong history of populism, the popular sector
may be more willing to draw on this history and resist policies that might destroy the rights
they acquired under previous models. The importance of the history of populism to the
formation and strength of social movements in response to neoliberalism draws on the
relative deprivation theory of social movements. Although the periods of national populism
in each country have been incredibly complicated, members of the popular sector
consistently see these periods of sustained growth and development. As the relative
deprivation model explains, social movements are most likely to occur after a sharp
economic or political crisis that followed a period of prolonged growth or development. For
the popular sector, this crisis was the neoliberal era. This history of national populism draws
on the broader role of both ideology and historical institutionalism in the framing of certain
grievances. Members of the popular sector bought into the old ideology of populism and may
have even dramatized the past because in times of such devastating crises, they needed to
resort to some sort of frame of reference
Exclusionary Policies and the Openness of Political Institutions
This factor is most closely related to the political process model of social movements.
In the context of anti-neoliberal social movements, the governments of the countries
examined enacted policies that socioeconomically and politically excluded the popular sector.
On the one hand, economic and social policies led to unemployment, decrease in standards of
living, restricted access to social services, and made it more difficult for members of the
popular sector to survive, let alone actively participate in the legitimate political process.
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These policies became the grievances against which the popular sector was protesting. On the
other hand, neoliberal politicians also adopted political reforms that increased the power of
the president, distanced the relationship between politician and citizen, and weakened the
power of traditional organizational institutions, such as political parties and labor unions.
According to Roberta Rice (2012), countries with weak political institutions were unable to
channel the demands of the popular sector and, therefore, people in these countries turned to
contentious politics.42 The openness of political institutions is a manifestation of the political
process model because the social movements are dependent on the political opportunity
structures available. If political institutions are strong enough to incorporate or silence the
demands of the popular sector, then social movement actors will either willingly or
unwillingly resort to political processes. However, if political institutions are either unwilling
or unable to represent the interests of the popular sector yet the popular sector still has
freedoms of speech and assembly, social movement actors will more likely resort to mass
mobilization. According to Veltmeyer (2007), three potential paths were available to antineoliberal social movements. The three paths were through electoral politics and
incorporation, direct action through mass mobilization, and local development.43 Although
these three paths were not mutually exclusive, the exclusionary policies and the openness of
political institutions played a crucial role in which path was most utilized for each country.
Economic Crises
Economic crises played a large role in strengthening the effects of exclusionary
policies, revealed the limitations of the neoliberal ideology to the masses, and weakened the
government’s capacity to implement further neoliberal policies or control its population. The
severe Latin American debt crisis was one of the original motivations for the implementation
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of neoliberal policies in the region. Various regional economic crises, such as the Mexican
peso crash of 1994 and the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, strengthened the
intensity and frequency of mass mobilization or provided a greater motivation for social
movement organizations to create horizontal linkages. The effect of the economic crisis on
the social movements varied by country and was dependent on the severity of the crisis and
the extent of movement organization and coordination.
Framing
One of the most important factors to the sustainability and the ultimate success of a
social movement was how the leaders were able to frame the movement and attract members
from all different societal groups. Neoliberal policies hurt the popular sector the most and
actors from this group were generally the leaders of social movements. However, the
sustainability of anti-neoliberal social movements was dependent on the ability of these
actors to form horizontal linkages across different groups and appeal to middle class actors.
During the first waves of neoliberal contention in the late 1980s and early 1990s, labor
unions were often essential in the formation of these horizontal linkages. However, as the
1990s advanced, social movement organizations began to act alongside or independent of
unions and appeal to cultural and identity ties. Indigenous groups and community
organizations replaced unions as the most important actors. This framing factor is similar to
the resource mobilization theory of social movements, as it emphasizes the importance of
making a movement appealing to multiple societal groups in order to acquire both resources
and support.
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Each of these factors is necessary but insufficient to explain the rise, proliferation,
and success of national anti-neoliberal social movements. They are all interrelated, especially
since social movements do not happen in a vacuum. A history of national populism is
necessary because it provided the popular sector with an alternative ideology to the
hegemonic neoliberal discourse and helped establish the policies of the anti-neoliberal
regimes. Socioeconomic exclusionary policies are necessary because they formed the
grievances of the popular sector against neoliberalism and the governments in charge.
Political exclusionary policies forced the popular sector and, eventually the middle classes, to
take to the streets to voice their grievances, as most formal political channels were restricted.
Economic crises forced people to see the inherent weaknesses and flaws of neoliberalism and
severely weakened the governmental capacity of the neoliberal state. In many ways, these
economic crises made people realize that neoliberalism could and should have been
overthrown. Finally, effective framing was essential to mobilizing both people and resources
and making these movements national and sustainable. As will be seen in Chapter Four,
national movements largely did not occur if the main social movement organizers were
unable to form horizontal linkages with each other and the middle classes. However, if these
organizations were able to frame their grievances in a national context to appeal to the largest
number of people possible, the likelihood of a social movement causing the ouster of
neoliberal politicians greatly increased.
The next chapter examines the role of these factors in the successful anti-neoliberal
social movements in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.
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Chapter 3:
¡Ya Basta!1
Anti-neoliberal Social Movements in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela
Mass movements protesting the implementation of neoliberal policies and leading to
widespread social unrest characterized many South American countries throughout the 1990s
and early 2000s. During this time, these countries were enacting economic and political
reforms to address economic downturns, debt crises, and pressure from international actors.
Many of these reforms adversely affected the lower and working classes and the popular
sector, while benefitting those in power and the elites. They led to decreased wages,
increased poverty, a rise in the power of the executive, and a decline in the political power of
the people. Because the people most affected by neoliberalism often had neither the power
nor the resources to challenge these policies through political channels, they turned to
contentious politics to spread awareness and voice their grievances. This chapter examines
the different social movements against neoliberalism in four South American countries:
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. These four countries represent examples of
social movements and contentious politics that have been instrumental in defeating neoliberal
politicians and empowering governments promising anti-neoliberal positions and then
enacting legislation fulfilling these promises. In this chapter, I argue that certain historical,
institutional, and social factors help to explain the success of a movement in accomplishing
its goals. These factors include a country’s history of national populism, exclusionary
policies regarding the openness of a country’s political institutions, economic crises that
exacerbate this sense of exclusion, and the ability of social movement organizations to frame
the issue and gain support across multiple groups while forming strong horizontal linkages.
These four countries have all had a strong degree of national populism in their past, had
governments that enacted exclusionary policies to restrict the openness of political
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institutions, experienced multiple acute economic crises, and had social movement
organizations that formed strong horizontal linkages.
Argentina: From Menemismo to Kirchnerismo
Argentina’s anti-neoliberal social movements may be the most often covered example
of the masses using contentious politics to force political and economic reform. Less than a
decade after the fall of a military dictatorship that killed nearly 40,000 of its own citizens,
Argentina experienced some of the most sweeping neoliberal reforms under President Carlos
Menem (1989-1999). Although the country experienced large degrees of economic growth
during Menem’s presidency, the popular sector did not benefit from this growth. Eventually
Menem’s policies failed to produce sustainable growth and the country suffered one of the
worst economic crises since the Great Depression that culminated in December 2001.2
Throughout Menem’s presidency and, most notably, in response to this economic collapse,
contentious politics was a tool of both the popular sector and the middle classes. The
movement achieved success in the wake of the economic collapse as mass mobilization
forced the resignation of two neoliberal presidents in the span of just a few months. After a
brief caretaker government, Argentines elected Nestor Kirchner in 2003. Kirchner was an
openly anti-neoliberal president and his policies (described later in the chapter) reflected his
worldview.
History of National Populism
Argentina has one of the richest populist histories in Latin America. Under the
various presidencies of Juan Domingo Perón, Argentina replaced commodity-led growth
with ISI and economic nationalism. Although Perón was president in the 1940s and 1950s
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and for a brief period in the 1970s, Peronism left a lasting effect on Argentine politics that is
still apparent to this day. Peronism emphasized a strong national state that employed a large
portion of Argentine citizens, especially in the industries of energy, telecommunications,
transportation, utilities and infrastructure.3 During this time, Argentina’s middle class and
skilled laborers grew and flourished and there were ample social services, including one of
the most comprehensive pension systems in the region. Like other countries in the region,
labor unions were the main vehicle for organization and political representation under Perón.
The Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT) became the dominant labor federation
under Perón and remained a strong voice for the popular sector in Argentine politics until
well into Menem’s presidency. Although the CGT became a dominant force in labor
organization and the political process, Perón also empowered millions of Argentines by
extending political participation to the popular sector throughout the country. Despite Perón’s
occasionally antagonistic relationship with the United States and accusations of being a
dictator, the Argentine popular sector constantly used Perón’s policies as a way of framing
their grievances against Menem’s neoliberalism.
Exclusionary Policies and the Openness of Political Institutions
Carlos Menem is the president most associated with neoliberalism in Argentina.
Despite being elected on a populist platform as a member of Perón’s labor party, the Partido
Justicialista (PJ), a severe debt crisis and pressure from international economic institutions
forced Menem to adopt neoliberal policies to shrink the country’s national debt and make
Argentina’s economy more open to outside investors. Many of these policies led to the
socioeconomic exclusion of the popular sector – the working class, union members, and the
poor. These exclusionary policies produced discontent among these sectors. Menem also
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enacted politically exclusionary policies through the strengthening of executive power and
the weakening of unions and political parties that had historically been ways for the popular
sector to hold their leaders accountable. These exclusionary policies meant that
neoliberalism’s worst victims did not realistically have the option of voicing their grievances
through traditional political structures. Therefore, when the formal political option was not
there, these groups resorted to the street and contentious politics to enact reform.
In 1989, a large national debt, hyperinflation, stagnation, and a lack of capital inflows
characterized the Argentine economy. The GDP had decreased by 10% since 1980, the fiscal
deficit was 7.6% of GDP, the gross investment rate was only 14% of GDP, and
hyperinflation was out of control.4 Menem, with the help of a team of economic experts and
the IMF, implemented a comprehensive market stabilization program to lower inflation and
privatize numerous state-run industries. The centerpiece of Menem’s policy was the
Convertibility Plan of 1991. This policy pegged the Argentine peso to the US dollar at a oneto-one ratio and had the full backing of the monetary base of the IMF.5 Although the pegging
of the peso to the dollar did help temporarily curb inflation, it also made the peso much more
vulnerable to international economic crises and opened the country up to currency
speculators.
Along with the Convertibility Plan, Menem also enacted a variety of reforms that
privatized numerous industries and severely cut social services. These policies led to a drastic
increase in unemployment, falling wages, increase in poverty and extreme poverty, and an
increase in the number of workers in the informal sector. For example, although inflation
drastically decreased during Menem’s first years in office, unemployment doubled between
1991 and 1994 and the elimination of subsidies for food, energy and transportation reinforced
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the cycles of extreme poverty.6 When people cannot find work and can barely find enough
food to survive, they generally feel excluded by their government. These discriminatory
policies against the marginalized would eventually become the main grievances that the
framers of social movements relied on to mobilize the popular sector.
Despite these exclusionary socioeconomic policies that adversely affected the poorest
sectors of society, the large degrees of macroeconomic growth during Menem’s first years
benefited a large number of Argentines, especially those of upper-middle and upper classes.
Although there were some social movements against Menem during this time, they were
mainly composed of the poorer sectors, generally unorganized, and usually relegated to the
provinces, far away from the central government. However, Menem’s response to the
Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994 drastically affected most sectors of the Argentine economy and
made more people question the benefits of neoliberalism because of the exclusionary policies
he enacted to mitigate the contagion. Because neoliberalism was so pro-free market and antigovernment intervention in times of crises, Argentina’s GDP plummeted and formal
unemployment rose to over 16%, the highest it had ever been in the country’s history.7 In the
working class neighborhoods and villas, or shantytowns, unemployment was three to four
times higher and finding enough food to survive was a daily struggle. Moreover, this crisis
also hurt middle class and skilled workers who had previously not been as drastically
affected by neoliberalism.
In the wake of the Mexican Peso Crisis, privatization and structural adjustment
programs drastically increased and the working and middle class sectors of the Argentine
economy were feeling socioeconomically excluded, especially in the provinces. Argentina is
a country of more than 40 million people but nearly 15 million live either in Buenos Aires or
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the surrounding suburbs.8 However, despite the size of metropolitan Buenos Aires, the
majority of the country’s natural resources – such as soy, natural gas, and oil – are found in
the provinces of Argentina. Therefore, the urban-rural divide in the country is incredibly
drastic. The people in the provinces experienced many of the neoliberal policies before the
citizens of Buenos Aires. One of the biggest state owned companies to operate in the
provinces was Fiscal Oil Fields (YPF), which operated mainly in the western province of
Neuquén and the northwestern province of Salta. For 40 years, this company was the largest
employer for each province and gave generous wages and benefits to its workers.9 However,
the company was privatized in 1991; and unemployment and poverty skyrocketed. The
exclusionary policies related to this privatization increased after the Mexican Peso Crisis, as
the unemployment benefits expired and social services were virtually nonexistent.10 Similar
privatization was rampant across the provinces. In the wake of these exclusionary
socioeconomic policies, people began to demand more from their government. When the
formal political route was not available, they turned to social movements. Some of these
social movements, which will be analyzed below, included occupations of government
buildings, riots, roadblocks, and widespread looting.11 Social movement organizations,
whether labor unions or community groups, mobilized those most affected and organized
these movements because of their ability to frame the issue and forge horizontal linkages. A
further examination of these framing tactics will be discussed below.
Although the provinces may have faced the most drastic socioeconomic exclusionary
policies, the people of metropolitan Buenos Aires were not spared. In fact, porteños,
residents of Buenos Aires, were often more acutely affected by exclusionary policies,
especially in the final years of Menem’s presidency. Buenos Aires is home to the richest and
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the poorest members of Argentine society. Giant mansions are just blocks away from vast
squatters neighborhoods and slums. However, there is also one of the strongest middle and
working classes in all of South America that calls the city home. As neoliberal policies
entrenched themselves into Argentine society in the 1990s, more and more porteños were
feeling the effects of free market reforms. One of the neoliberal trends that particularly
affected and excluded the middle classes was income concentration. The richest portions of
society greatly benefited from deregulation, privatization, low taxes, and high degrees of
capital flows. These same policies greatly affected the poorest sectors of society, making it
difficult to find the necessary sustenance to survive. In the midst of this income concentration,
the middle class was squeezed out. Lawyers, teachers, doctors, students, and state employees
experienced the same cuts in social services and subsidies, along with decreases in incomes.
These people became some of the most active members of social movements, especially in
Buenos Aires.
Socioeconomic exclusionary policies reached an all-time high immediately after
Menem’s presidency, during the severe economic crisis from 1999-2001. In the wake of this
economic crisis, newly elected president, Fernando de la Rúa, accepted another IMF
structural adjustment program that included bills to increase labor flexibility, cut public
sector wages, decrease social services, deregulate health insurance, and drastically cut fiscal
spending.12 After these programs did not ease the crisis, de la Rúa appointed Domingo
Cavallo, the architect of the Convertibility Plan, as finance minister. Cavallo, who had
always been a strong ally of the IMF, announced a plan that would rapidly slash the fiscal
deficit through a 13% cut in public sector salaries, massive layoffs in state-run companies,
the cutting of spending of public universities and hospitals, and the conversion of part of
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public workers’ salaries to bond issues.13 Once again, these policies severely hurt the popular
sector but they also were incredibly painful for students and members of the middle class as
well, and these groups became even more actively involved in the organization of social
movements because of these exclusionary policies.
This growing sense of socioeconomic exclusion came to a head in December 2001
when the government introduced the corralito to help prevent a run on the banks because of
rumors of devaluation of the already weak peso. The corralito, or playpen in Spanish,
immediately closed all banks and then imposed strict restrictions on withdrawals from
accounts. Since many of these banks were either failed or failing, many people lost their
entire savings. Eduardo Silva sums up how the response to the corralito was indicative of
Argentines’ views of the neoliberal project after more than a decade or free market reforms:
The corralito summed up the public’s anger with the entire neoliberal project:
anger toward a heartless IMF – a symbol of international capitalism – that
forced unreasonable stabilization targets on the country with callous disregard
of its consequences for livelihood; anger at politicians for not standing up the
IMF’s demands and, thus, for their complicity in foisting a policy of hunger
and deepening misery; anger over persistent support for fiscal, economic, and
social policies that translated into a bleak future of mushrooming
unemployment, precarious work, and job insecurity.14
The corralito was the last straw for the majority of Argentines. Millions of porteños of all
classes took to the streets of Buenos Aires to demand an end to IMF policies and the
dismissal of corrupt politicians. There were widespread protests, looting, rioting, and
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roadblocks around the country and de la Rúa was forced to resign only two weeks after the
corralito’s implementation. These socioeconomic exclusionary policies served as the
grievances for these millions of Argentines in the formation of social movements during the
1990s.
These exclusionary socioeconomic policies were combined with exclusionary
political policies that substantially increased the power of the executive and decreased the
power and influence of political parties and labor unions. Since the time of Perón, political
parties and labor unions had large amounts of organizational and political power and served
as a strong conduit between the government and the lower and working classes. Although he
ran on a populist platform and was a member of Perón’s labor party, Menem enacted a
number of policies that strengthened the power of the executive and his administration at the
expense of unions and political parties. Given that Argentina is a democracy with a recent
history of military rule, Menem had to find a way to democratically implement his financial
policies and dampen the power of unions without being accused of overstepping his political
powers. He maneuvered this challenge by granting executive decree powers to privatize, cut
civil services, and control subsidies and regulations along with increasing the number of
Supreme Court justices in order to stack the court with political supporters.15 The expansion
of executive power also extended to the provinces, where governors were given more power
at the expense of provincial legislatures. Along with strengthening the power of the executive,
he also weakened the power of labor unions, most notably the CGT. Through clientelism,
favoring loyalists, silencing dissidents, and manipulating union competition, Menem was
able to virtually silence the CGT, which used to be one of the most powerful political
organizations in Argentina.16 This increase in executive power combined with the decrease in
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union and political party power to severely restrict the openness of Argentine political
institutions to the masses. According to McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996), when a
democratic institutionalized political system is relatively closed or restricted, people are more
likely to turn to social movements and contentious politics to voice their grievances and
demand reform. These political opportunity structures promote people to act outside of the
formal political process, especially if they are living in a democracy where a state’s capacity
and propensity for repression is relatively low. Argentina represents the middle ground in
that the institutionalized political system was not willing to represent the views of its
constituents but it was democratic enough to allow other forms of association.
Not only did the executive become much more powerful in neoliberal Argentina, the
IMF and the World Bank were the main architects of many of Argentina’s economic reforms.
As Joseph Stiglitz (2002) points out, these international organizations are notoriously
authoritarian and lack transparency. Argentines did not know the people who were
controlling their economy and knew that they did not have any political power to oppose
these policies. Because they did not have any other way to protest neoliberalism, people
turned to the streets, where they felt they had a bit more agency. These socioeconomic and
political exclusionary policies combined with Argentines’ history of populism and severe
economic crises to motivate people to resort to contentious politics to bring about the reforms
that traditional political methods failed to accomplish.
Economic Crises
Two international economic crises helped contribute to the weakening of the
neoliberal state and to the implementation of exclusionary economic policies that fostered
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widespread discontent and unrest among the popular sectors of Argentina. These two crises
were the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994 and the East Asian Financial Crisis and Brazilian
Currency Crisis of 1997-1999. Ironically, the Latin American Debt Crisis was one of the
main reasons why neoliberalism first came to Argentina. In the 1980s, Argentina racked up
massive foreign debts because of indiscriminate government spending. GDP was shrinking
and inflation was high. This economic crisis prompted many Argentines to initially welcome
free market reforms if it meant an end to fiscal debt and inflation.17 Both the upper and
middle classes supported neoliberalism during Menem’s first presidency because of the
initial successes of his anti-inflationary and convertibility policies. However, the
international contagion of the 1994 Mexican Peso was the first international blow against
neoliberalism. Prior to 1994, the countries that had enacted neoliberal reforms had
experienced immediate rates of economic growth and drastic declines in inflation. However,
the devaluation of the peso revealed many of the risks associated with depending on
conditional foreign aid to stimulate economic growth. It has also revealed how globalized
and interconnected the international economy had become, as the crisis severely affected all
of Latin America and affected economies around the world. Although the IMF and neoliberal
supporters blame the crisis on irresponsible spending by the Mexican government, the crisis
particularly hurt the countries of the Southern Cone, despite their adherence to the IMF.18
The crisis led to high rates of unemployment in Argentina, along with exclusionary policies.
Moreover, this crisis revealed the flaws of neoliberalism and the vulnerability of the
Argentine economy to external shocks and crises.19 No longer was neoliberalism an infallible
economic doctrine; the number of supporters within the Argentine government and society
quickly declined. This combination of exclusionary policies and the decrease in the ability
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for the government to provide for its people and build consent to neoliberalism led to a
variety of social movements against the government throughout the second half of the 1990s.
The most drastic economic crisis to hit Argentina began in 1999 when unemployment
rose to over 50% and people lost their life savings when they were unable to withdraw their
money from failing banks. However, similar to the Mexican Peso Crisis, other international
crises both spurred on and sustained the 1999 crisis. The 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis
caused currency crises around the world, including the Brazilian Real Crisis of 1999.
Because the IMF had granted conditional aid to countries around the world and opened these
previously closed economies to international currency speculators, the strength of one
currency was often dependent on the health of another. Therefore, the collapse of a single
currency could lead to economic crises around the world. Although there were other causes
to the 1999-2001 Argentine economic crisis, these two international crises were significant
factors. Once again, this crisis showed the weaknesses of and lack of support for
neoliberalism. Menem had adopted so many political reforms to increase the power of the
executive during his presidency that the only supporters he had were in his immediate circle
or the upper classes. Once Menem left office, de la Rúa was not as effective and proved
unable to follow the IMF policies in the wake of such a severe crisis. With virtually no
supporters for neoliberalism left, de la Rúa was unable to address the grievances of the
mobilized masses and was forced to resign in December of 2001. Although these economic
crises were not the only causes of socioeconomic and political exclusionary policies, they
often exacerbated these policies while also revealing the many weaknesses of neoliberalism.
These crises served as essential catalysts on which framers depended to mobilize and
organize the sectors of the population most adversely affected. They also weakened the
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Argentine government so that their only responses were repression of social movements and
more neoliberal policies.
Framing
Although a history of national populism, exclusionary policies, and economic crises
were necessary to the formation of social movements in Argentina, the ability of social
movement organizers to frame these issues and form horizontal linkages with other social
movement organizations was crucial to the sustainability and success of these movements.
Initially, labor unions were the primary social movement organizers as they had strong ties to
the working and lower classes and were able to effectively mobilize these sectors against
privatization, unemployment, declining social services, and increasing poverty. However, as
the 1990s progressed, the power of labor unions declined because of government policies and
an increase in policies that affected more than just the working class. Although labor unions
still played a significant role in organizing and framing collective action throughout the
neoliberal era, neighborhood and community organizations, unemployed workers, political
brokers, and piqueteros became essential to the success of contentious politics. Appealing to
both the middle class and popular sector and framing neoliberalism as a series of foreignimposed policies that had corrupted Argentine politicians, social movement organizers
successfully used contentious politics to oust neoliberal politicians and install a government
that was dedicated to enacting a more humane form of capitalism.
When workers realized that the Menem government had coopted the formerly
powerful CGT, major union players organized the CTA, which would prove to be the most
powerful anti-neoliberal union throughout the 1990s. This union incorporated the teachers
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union, a major state employee union, as well as various popular sector unions that were much
more militant and willing to openly challenge neoliberalism.20 Although the militancy and
radicalism of the CTA made it difficult for them to align with more mainstream labor
organizations, its ability to frame their grievances and attract workers from all sectors helped
make it a significant player in the anti-neoliberal movement. Unlike other unions, the CTA
appealed to both the employed and unemployed and reframed the identity of workers to
include everyone, regardless of his or her employment situation.21 Moreover, its demands for
workers’ rights, full employment, social services, and the inclusion of social and economic
rights in government policies appealed to millions of Argentines in the popular sector.22 The
main ways the CTA attempted to voice its grievances were through strikes, protests, marches
and demonstrations. These movements served two purposes: to protest neoliberalism and to
gain more supporters or form more horizontal linkages. Another tactic to gain more power
socially and politically was the formation of the Frepaso political party that featured
candidates with views similar to the CTA. Despite its effective framing and political
strategies, Menem was able to largely silence the CTA thanks to his vast executive powers
and his control over the still influential CGT.23
Although the CTA was not particularly powerful in Buenos Aires in the first half of
the 1990s, it was able to get a strong following in the provinces where poverty and
unemployment were generally higher and the federal government did not have as powerful of
a say. The organization organized a number of important social movements against
decentralization, unpaid wages, wage reductions, layoffs, loss of job security, welfare cuts,
and government corruption.24 The most notable of these social movements was the
Santiagazo in December of 1993. This violent protest in the capital city of the northwestern
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province of Santiago del Estero involved thousands of demonstrators and caused millions of
dollars in damage.25 The thousands of demonstrators protested the delayed payment of public
sector employees and the adoption of an Omnibus Law by attacking, looting, and setting fire
to the Government House, the courthouse, the Legislature, and the homes of prominent
politicians. There was little to no riot or police control because the police officers were
among the public employees who were owed back pay and did not want to risk their lives to
protect a government that could not even pay them.26 The Santiagazo was the first major
movement against neoliberalism in Argentina.
Although the Santiagazo acquired similar characteristics of many mass protests (most
notably a descent into chaos), the movement was neither spontaneous nor unorganized. First
of all, there were more than 50 organized strikes or street demonstrations in Santiago del
Estero in 1993 prior to the Santiagazo.27 The CTA, along with the local teachers’ and
pensioners’ unions were influential in the formation of these movements and formed strong
horizontal brokerage ties through these constant interactions.28 The CTA’s tactic of
protesting to voice grievances and gain support led to the incorporation of numerous state
employees. Therefore, once the owed wages were not paid and the Omnibus Bill was signed
in December, these groups had already formed strong ties and mobilization was much more
effective. However, this movement greatly escalated in scope and significance because of a
certain degree of spontaneity. In interviews with a variety of people who participated in the
Santiagazo, Javier Auyero (2002) notes how many of the participants simply left their houses
to join the movements because of a sense of “contagious anger” toward the government.29
However, the organizers’ abilities to appeal to these grievances attracted not only workers,
but also doctors, teachers, lawyers, and students. Although the Santiagazo was unable to
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accomplish much in the form of political concessions, it helped lay the foundations for more
organized efforts by social movement actors in the future and set a precedent for violent
protests as a way to voice grievances.
Following the effects of the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994, anti-neoliberal contentious
politics began to be less labor union-centric and more focused on community and identity ties.
Once again, the major social movements were relegated to the provinces, most notably
Neuquén and Salta. In these provinces, where unemployment and poverty were so rampant,
people formed neighborhood-based unemployment commissions with outside funding from
the CTA.30 The organizations focused on building ties based on community and identity as
opposed to employment. The most significant contribution of these commissions was the
implementation of the use of the roadblock as a form of political resistance. Although the
roadblock was by no means a new idea, it proved to be an incredibly effective way of
disrupting commerce and making governments and corporations notice the most
marginalized of society. These roadblocks also introduced Argentines to the piqueteros, or
professional picketers. These members of the unemployed commissioners defended the
roadblocks and soon became a nationwide force that was involved in all of the major
movements across the country. The piqueteros developed their own identity and helped form
ties of solidarity among the many disillusioned youth throughout Argentina. They were also
valuable in framing the roadblocks and forming strong horizontal ties. The roadblocks were
often met with violent police repression because of the necessity of roads to the Argentine
economy. According to Silva, “Outrage at the arrogant, willful disregard for their felt
grievances, of their citizenship rights, and way of life, the whole town would come out to
defend them. Middle-class persons – such as teachers, professors, doctors, lawyers
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accountants, salespeople, and housewives – mobilized alongside unemployed workers and
poor people from housing projects.”31 Through the visible repression of these innocent and
peaceful protestors along with framing the actions as a recovery of the family and living with
dignity, social movement organizers were able to form horizontal linkages with these middle
class actors.32 Sympathetic media coverage and the government’s inability to resort to
undemocratic means to deal with these groups gained them support around the country.
Although the majority of the social movements and protests took place in the
provinces during the second half of the 1990s, community organizations in and around
Buenos Aires were also framing responses to neoliberalism centered on community solidarity.
Community organizations focused on trying to restore the dignity of the unemployed and of
squatters’ communities and on working together on subsistence movements. The CTA and
other community organizations created the slogan of “la nueva fábrica es el barrio” (“the
new factory is the neighborhood”) to stress the importance of community organizing and
expanded membership to unemployed workers and people who were not involved in the
formal economy.33 Along with this slogan, a number of subsistence movements arose that
stressed community solidarity to help people survive. This included the use of soup kitchens,
open congresses, movements in public spaces, and cross-community dialogues. One of the
most popular ones was the worker-run factory movement where unemployed factory workers
reclaimed shut down factories and worked in the factories to make a living.34 There were
countless examples of these subsistence movements among the most marginalized of Buenos
Aires that did not openly challenge the government through social movements but helped
form strong horizontal linkages among a variety of groups.
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The CTA was able to bring these rural and urban movements together to form a
national organization against neoliberalism. They experienced initial success with the
election of the Frepaso candidate, Fernando de la Rúa, to the presidency on an anti-neoliberal
campaign. However, once economic crises made de la Rúa dependent on the IMF and further
neoliberal policies, the strong horizontal linkages that social movement organizers had made
in both Buenos Aires and the provinces led to unprecedented contentious political actions.
Political brokers, community organizations, subsistence movements, labor unions, piqueteros,
and student organizations mobilized millions of Argentines of all classes to take to the streets
and demand government reform. Without the effective framing and mobilizing across
horizontal linkages during the 1990s, this sort of sustained social movement would have been
impossible.
Bolivia
Argentina’s neighbor to the northwest, Bolivia, experienced similar neoliberal
reforms throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Although the two countries share a border,
they are incredibly different socially, culturally, and economically. More than 50% of
Bolivia’s population is indigenous and there is much more poverty throughout the landlocked
nation. Moreover, unlike Argentina, the Bolivian middle class was much weaker prior to the
implementation of neoliberal reforms. However, the variety of socioeconomic and political
exclusionary policies enacted by neoliberal politicians and international economic crises
helped formed the grievances against neoliberalism and prompted citizens to look to
contentious politics to voice their grievances. The history of national populism and the ability
of social movement actors, most notably labor unions and indigenous organizations, to
effectively frame the movements in a national context were essential in the sustainability and
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success of the movements to eventually oust a number of neoliberal politicians and help
install Evo Morales as president. Morales, a member of the Aymara indigenous community,
has been an outspoken critic of neoliberalism and the United States and has enacted
numerous policies that have favored the indigenous community and the working class during
his presidency.
History of National Populism
In 1952, Bolivia experienced a major social revolution in which a new populist
political party, the Moviemiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) ousted the ruling political
elites. This movement was the first major social revolution in Latin America since the
Mexican Revolution and shared many similarities due to the role of the radically mobilized
peasantry.35 On the heels of this revolution, the MNR enacted a number of populist reforms
that greatly benefited both the urban and rural peasantry. For example, the government
nationalized a variety of industries (most notably tin mines), increased social services,
enacted significant of land reforms, extended citizenship rights (most notably enacting
universal suffrage), awarded peasants government positions, strengthened rural education,
and increased the power of labor unions.36 Similar to Perón’s party in Argentina, the MNR
was the only real political party in Bolivia. Although many of these policies greatly improved
the lives of peasants and workers, the government was constantly accused of totalitarian
practices and helped pave the way for the military governments of the 1960s and 1970s.
However, the achievements the Bolivian peasantry earned in terms of employment, land
reform, and citizenship rights was unprecedented. For example, prior to 1952, 8% of the
landholders owned 95% of cultivable land while 70% of the population held less than .5% of
the land.37 The land reform was designed to make land more productive and activate the rural
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labor force, which was generally well trained in agricultural practices, to work for themselves
instead of working for latifundistas, or owners of large plots of land. The program was
regarded as a success, as it redistributed about 1/3 of the land to poor farmers.38 Therefore,
despite the totalitarianism of the MNR and the ensuing military government, many rural and
urban peasants greatly benefited economically and politically from the MNR during this
period. It was essential for framers of anti-neoliberal social movements to emphasize this
time in Bolivian history to both appeal to peasants and campesinos and forge the appropriate
grievances.
Socioeconomic and Political Exclusionary Policies
Similar to Argentina, neoliberal policies that weakened the power of the state and
labor unions while simultaneously impoverishing the popular sectors dominated Bolivia
between 1985-2003. After more than two decades of military rule, democracy returned to
Bolivia in 1985 when Victor Paz Estenssoro was elected president. Ironically, Paz Estenssoro
was Bolivia’s first president following the 1952 revolution so many Bolivians imagined a
return to the times before the military regimes. However, due to the Latin American Debt
Crisis and the worldwide spread of neoliberalism in the 1980s, Paz Estenssoro initiated the
New Economic Policy (NEP), which was one of the most draconian neoliberal programs in
South America.39 In 1984 and 1985, Bolivia had a huge foreign debt and inflation was so
high that paper money was virtually useless and social unrest was rampant. Neoliberalism
was the response to this economic and social instability. Although neoliberal policies did
help restore some degrees of economic growth and lower inflation, they also served to
economically exclude large sectors of the population. In the aftermath of the implementation
of the policies, poverty stayed above 50% in urban areas and above 77% in the countryside;
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the prices of basic utilities exacerbated this increase in poverty levels; privatization of the tin
mines cost thousands of workers their jobs; and trade liberalization permitted the introduction
of powerful international agribusinesses that cost peasants their land, money, and
livelihood.40 Although not directly related to neoliberalism, the Bolivian government also
adopted US-sponsored drug interdiction policies that included repossessing or destroying
lands used for coca production. Coca is the main ingredient in cocaine and the US was trying
to find ways to fight the war on drugs internationally. The US promised foreign aid in
exchange for Bolivian compliance with these policies. However, many Bolivian farmers
made their livelihood through the licit farming of coca and the crop has strong cultural ties to
the Bolivian indigenous communities. Many of these economic exclusionary policies
continued throughout the 1990s as more industries were privatized and the US war on drugs
continued to affect more and more coca farmers. These policies helped form the grievances
around which Bolivian peasants and indigenous groups would frame their social movements.
The most important socioeconomic exclusionary policies to understanding the
formation of anti-neoliberal contentious politics were the privatization of water and natural
gas in the late 1990s. These two privatizations led to massive and violent social movements
in Cochabamba and La Paz in 2000 and 2003. The actual social movements, the “Water War”
and the “Gas War” will be examined below, but it is important to note the exclusionary
policies that resulted from these privatizations and served as the impetus for rebellion. In the
wake of the international economic crises of the late 1990s, the Bolivian government, under
pressure from the World Bank, was forced to privatize the Cochabamba water system. In
1999, the Bolivian government signed a contract with American multinational, Bechtel
Corporation, which granted the corporation the right to provide tap water and remove
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wastewater in Cochabamba for the next 40 years.41 The contract gave Bechtel an incredible
amount of power because it allowed the corporation to set prices and take control of all
existing irrigation systems. Prior to the water system’s privatization, the state water company
had difficulties responding to the rapidly growing Cochabamba metropolitan population but
was able to provide fairly cheap water to the middle and upper classes.42 The rest of the
population relied on community networks, private wells, and water trucks for their water
needs. Although this situation was not perfect, people generally could access enough water to
survive. Bechtel’s contract gave the corporation control over these private wells and network
cooperatives and the new water prices were too high for many Cochabamba residents. Unlike
many of the previous economic exclusionary policies, the privatization of water affected
virtually all sectors of Bolivian society, as everyone was forced to pay more for water. The
breadth of people affected by the water privatization enabled framers to portray neoliberalism
as an attack against all Bolivians. This privatization led to the “Water War” of 2000 in which
hundreds of thousands of protesters were met with brutal police and military repression.
Three years later, in the midst of constant violent demonstrations against
neoliberalism throughout the country, the Bolivian government decided to sell natural gas
rights to a consortium of international corporations led by a California multinational. After
the “Water War”, the government continued to enact policies that adversely affected public
employees and the working class. Some of these policies led to a protest of police and
firefighters that resulted in violent military repression and the death of more than 30 people.43
Therefore, the popular sector was already on edge prior to the privatization of natural gas,
Bolivia’s leading natural export. Although not as many people were directly connected to
natural gas as they were to water, this privatization represented another example of the
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popular sector’s exclusion from the financial decisions of its government. This privatization
primarily affected miners and gas workers, the majority of whom lived in the La Paz suburb
of El Alto, but Bolivians of all classes participated in the ensuing “Gas War” of 2003 as a
way to voice their grievances of nearly two decades of neoliberal policies. With the help of
adept framers, the “Gas War” was the last straw for neoliberalism in Bolivia.
Along with these socioeconomic exclusionary policies, the MNR enacted a variety of
political reforms that both extended the power of the executive while decreasing the power of
labor unions. These reforms, along with the increasingly powerful role of international
economic institutions, greatly excluded the majority of Bolivians from participation in the
democratic politics of the Bolivian government. In the face of this exclusion, Bolivians
turned to other groups, mainly labor unions and indigenous organizations, to voice their
political grievances. Once they realized the formal political avenue was unavailable,
Bolivians turned to social movements to make the government listen to them.
Shortly after Paz Estenssoro took office, he enacted a number of reforms to centralize
the Bolivian government and grant the executive much more power in the implementation of
neoliberal policies. Similar to Menem, Paz Estenssoro relied on the power of the executive to
rule by decree to enact economic policies without having to worry about legislative
opposition.44 In a country where military regimes had decimated the power of political
parties, legislative opposition was virtually nonexistent during the neoliberal era. The
coercive power of the government, the role of international organizations, and the weakening
of formerly powerful labor unions were other political exclusionary policies that restricted
certain political opportunity structures and motivated people to turn to social movements. In
order to implement his policies with greater ease, Paz Estenssoro used his constitutional
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powers to declare a 90-day state of siege whenever he felt there was a state of emergency;
this policy gave the executive the right to suspend constitutional rights and use the army to
repress protests.45 This state of siege policy was used liberally throughout the neoliberal era.
More so than Argentina, Bolivia was incredibly dependent on aid from other countries and
international institutions. The United States provided large amounts of aid to the Bolivian
government in return for its role in the international war on drugs. Moreover, by 1999,
Bolivia ranked 12th in the world in per-capita aid.46 Virtually all of this aid was conditional
and the Bolivian people had little to no say in the adoption of these conditions. Dependence
on foreign actors is the perfect example of political exclusion. The weakening of labor unions
was a final political exclusionary policy that furthered alienated the majority of Bolivians
from the political process. During the MNR’s first regime in the 1950s, unions served as an
important resource for the government to gain support among the popular sector. However,
because Paz Estenssoro knew that he would encounter strong opposition to his policies from
unions, he set out to weaken their power and influence through a variety of decrees. As these
formerly powerful unions were weakened, more militant unions arose who relied on
contentious politics to voice their grievances. Although presidents in the 1990s attempted to
open formerly restricted political organizations in order to incorporate indigenous
organizations and dampen their power, many of these attempts were outdated and superficial
and insufficient in the face of widespread socioeconomic and political exclusion. Moreover,
the weakening of unions led to the rise of identity groups, most notably indigenous
organizations, who would prove to be crucial social movement organizers.
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Economic Crises
Similar to Argentina, various international economic crises in the 1990s exacerbated
socioeconomic and political exclusionary policies and revealed the flaws of neoliberalism to
the Bolivian masses. Although the Latin American Debt Crisis helped enable neoliberals to
enact free market reforms in the 1980s, the Mexican Peso Crisis and the East Asian Financial
Crisis severely weakened neoliberalism in Bolivia. Since Bolivia is a much poorer country
than Argentina, international crises had more of an acute effect on the country. The Mexican
Peso Crisis hurt the Bolivian currency and increased the country’s dependence on foreign aid.
This increase in dependence led to an increase in privatization and further drug eradication
policies. These new policies drastically weakened the power of the state so that the only
response the Bolivian government could provide to social movements was violent repression.
The East Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s and the collapse of the Argentine economy
in 2001 hit Bolivia particularly hard and further weakened the power of the central state.
These crises reduced domestic demand and exports and increased the fiscal deficit. However,
the Bolivian government could not increase spending because that would increase inflation
and violate IMF conditions. Once again, all the government could do was enact unpopular
economic stabilization policies that were met with massive social movements. The
government’s lack of capacity to peacefully respond to the grievances of the masses led to
military repression and widespread political turmoil. Eventually, Bolivian presidents who
supported neoliberalism could no longer simply respond with force to these social
movements and were ultimately forced to resign.
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Framing
Due to Bolivia’s large indigenous and peasant populations, the most powerful social
movement organizations in Bolivia’s anti-neoliberal contentious politics era were based more
so on identity than class. However, these indigenous and peasant movements were most
powerful in the rural regions of the country and relied on militant labor unions to attract
urban workers. By framing their grievances of neoliberalism in terms of an attack on
indigenous identities, economic livelihood, and the Bolivian nation as a whole, these social
movement organizations attracted the large number of Bolivians in the popular sector.
Moreover, their effective responses to particular economic crises or exclusionary policies
allowed them to appeal to the middle class and convince a large majority of Bolivians to
support the ousting of neoliberal politicians.
From the 1950s until the 1980s, the national labor union, the Bolivian Workers’
Confederation (COB), was the major social movement organizer in Bolivia. However, as the
neoliberal governments coopted the COB in the late 1980s, indigenous organizations, most
notably the Aymara in the highland plateaus, became the major social movement actors.
Although the cultural and political identity of the Aymara in the highlands had been strong
since the 1970s, they became more politically active throughout the nation in the 1990s.
These groups mainly protested land reform policies, drug eradication efforts, and a lack of
national recognition. Because an estimated 62% of Bolivians identified themselves as
members of an indigenous community in the 2001 census and that percentage was even
higher in politically important areas such as El Alto and Cochabamba, these organizations
were crucial in the formation of horizontal brokerage ties.47
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Another crucial framing group was the coalition of coca-grower federations. This
largely indigenous organization was able to bring urban and rural groups together because
they were largely rural farmers but they also became powerful players in militant urban labor
organizations. One reason for the increase in influence and success of the coca grower
federations was due to the nature of their work. Coca is largely grown in rural areas on small
plots of land away from the central government so it is nearly “…impossible for the
government to cripple this economic sector and its unions as it had done with tine miners,
where shutting down key firms with a concentrated work force did the trick.”48 In the wake
of the demise of the COB, the CSUTCB became the most powerful national labor federation.
This organization did not have the same power as the COB, so it was much more militant and
open to new leadership. The coca grower federations accepted this new leadership position
because coca eradication was one of the most contentious issues for all Bolivians in the
1990s. Moreover, the coca farmers became a national symbol for resistance against
neoliberalism and international domination. Drug eradication destroyed the homes and
livelihoods of so many people related to coca farming due to foreign interests. However, coca
is a licit product in Bolivia and is a strong part of the Aymara and Quechua cultures of the
region.49 Since the coca growers were able to force some minor concessions from the
government, they attracted support from other social movement organizations and were able
to form strong horizontal linkages. For example, urban workers and teachers would add their
grievances over privatization and education reform to help strengthen coca-eradication
efforts and coca growers would supply manpower for roadblocks during education reform
resistance.50 These horizontal linkages helped transform anti-neoliberal protests from
regional to national movements.
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Throughout the 1990s, the CSUTCB and the coca growers framed mobilization
around the ideas of “life, coca, and national sovereignty.”51 Coca became a symbol of
indigenous culture in both urban and rural areas; national sovereignty symbolized the fact
that the Bolivian government had little say in the implementation of neoliberal and drug
eradication policies; and life spoke to the widespread poverty and atrocious living standards
throughout the country brought on by free market reforms. Instead of focusing on class
struggle, these movements focused on self-determination, identity, and human rights and
appealed to many different social groups. Although the various social movements did not
achieve many significant concessions in the 1990s, they were essential in the refinement of
the framing of the issue and further strengthening of horizontal linkages between indigenous
organizations, farmers, urban workers, and the middle class.
The two most successful and influential examples of effective framing were the
Water War and Gas War. The Water War of 2000 featured hundreds of thousands of
Cochabamba residents protesting the privatization of water and subsequent government
repression. However, unlike previous mass mobilizations, this movement became a form of
national resistance against neoliberalism and was able to gain significant political
concessions. This movement was successful not only because of the fact that it negatively
affected nearly all Cochabamba residents, but also because social movement actors were able
to frame water privatization as an attack on every Bolivian, no matter where they lived or
their economic class. Response to the privatization started on the local level when a variety
of local unions formed the Coordinadora por la Defensa del Agua y la Vida (Coordinator for
the Defense of Water and Life). Although largely ignored by the local government, it was
able to cultivate the support of workers, farmers, indigenous groups, teachers, students,
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doctors, and state employees. Government alienation prompted the Coordinadora to call for
people to take to the streets. People of all classes turned out in massive numbers and there
were widespread roadblocks, occupations of government buildings, and strikes. These
movements were met with government repression but, similar to Argentina, government
repression only strengthened the resolve of those protesting and motivated more bystanders
to join the movements.52 As the movement gained more national attention, the coca growers
and CSUTCB joined the protests and provided manpower and resources. Moreover,
appealing to Bolivians’ indigenous roots transformed the Water War from a regional protest
to a national movement. One way they were able to make the Water War into a national
movement was through the framing of the issue through the concept of ayllu democracy.
Ayllu democracy is an Aymara term that refers to kinship networks that controlled and
allocated land.53 Ayllus was the primary form of social, political, and economic organization
among the Aymara. The CSUTCB’s framing of the Water War as a threat to the ayllu
mobilized hundreds of thousands of Aymara throughout Bolivia. After weeks of political
unrest, the Bolivian government agreed to terminate the contract with Bechtel and granted a
number of concessions to make water more accessible to the residents of Cochabamba.
According to Silva (2009):
The Water War marked a turning point in resistance to neoliberalism. It was a
local issue with national resonance in which tried and true government
mechanisms of political exclusion, manipulation, and repression only stiffened
resolve and expanded mobilization by heterogeneous social groups that
included middle classes who obtained significant concessions.54
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The Water War was the first successful anti-neoliberal social movement in Bolivia and
showed people that neoliberalism could be defeated if enough of the public was educated and
mobilized.
The second successful example of framing came in the 2003 Gas War that consumed
metropolitan La Paz and eventually led to the resignation of then President Gonzalo Sánchez
de Lozada and the eventual election of Evo Morales. The transformations and advancements
in associational power of anti-neoliberal social groups of the recent years came to a head
after the Bolivian government privatized most of the natural gas industry. This privatization,
along with the negative effects of the Argentine economic failure of 2001, prompted between
500,000 and two million teachers, miners, students, farmers, indigenous peoples, and pretty
much anyone else to take to the streets across the country.55 Once again, these protesters used
roadblocks, occupations, strikes, and other form of contentious politics to cause political
instability and reveal the weakness of the central government. When the demonstrators were
met with military or police repressions, their resolve grew and the movement attracted more
supporters. Throughout this entire movement, labor unions, coca growers, and indigenous
groups were organizing movements and mobilizing people around the country. The
widespread political unrest led to the resignation of neoliberal President Sánchez de Lozada
and the protesting continued until a president was elected who vowed to end Bolivia’s
dependence on neoliberalism and international actors. According to Silva (2009):
Thus the Gas War completed what the Water War started. It transformed the
demands from local, regional, or union-specific grievances to national-level
demands centered on sovereignty, state control of natural resources, pro-
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formal sector employment and workers’ rights policies, agrarian reform,
demilitarization of the drug war, and calls for a constituent assembly.56
Like Argentina in 2001, Bolivia had successfully used social movements to replace
neoliberal politicians with officials who pledged to enact policies that would implement a
more humane form of capitalism.
After just over a year of a caretaker government, Evo Morales became the first
indigenous president of Bolivia in 2005. The former leader of the coca grower federation and
outspoken social movement organizer throughout the neoliberal period took office and
promised an end to neoliberalism and a return to a more populist central government. Since
taking office, he had nationalized many key industries, legalized coca production, enacted a
variety of subsistence subsidies, enacted land reform, and organized a constituent assembly
to draft a new constitution.57 Thanks to a generous amount of aid from Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez, Morales has been able to restore some of the power of the Bolivian central
government. Although Bolivia is still a very poor country with a large portion of its
population living in poverty, the economy has been improving and the international
community does not have the same amount of control over Bolivian internal affairs as it once
did. This defeat of neoliberalism at the hand of social movements was in large part due to
political and economic exclusionary policies exacerbated by international economic crises
that provided the motivation to look to social movements and the country’s history of
national populism and effective framing to make the movements sustainable and sufficient.
Ecuador
The social movements of Ecuador, the third country analyzed in this chapter, differed
in many aspects from the cases of Argentina and Bolivia. Although social movements were
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ultimately successful in toppling a series of neoliberal presidents in favor of one committed
to a more humane form of capitalism, the main factors leading to these social movements
differed from other South American countries. For one, Ecuador’s history of national
populism was nowhere near as strong as in Argentina and Bolivia. Moreover, the president
does not have as much power in Ecuadorian politics as the other countries. The power of the
opposition and the legislature presented a different degree of openness of political institutions
and influenced how social movement actors framed their grievances. Similar to Bolivia,
Ecuador has a very large and mobilized indigenous population. Although the Ecuadorian
indigenous population is only about 25% of the total population, indigenous organizations
were the most crucial social movement actors during the neoliberal era (1984-2006). The
Confederación de Nacionalidades Indigenas de Ecuador (CONAIE) is often regarded as the
strongest indigenous movement in Latin America.58 Similar to Argentina and Bolivia,
contentious politics led to political instability and widespread social unrest that ultimately led
to the resignation of multiple presidents who enacted neoliberal reforms. In 2006, Rafael
Correa was elected president on an anti-neoliberal, economic nationalist platform. In his six
years as president, he has acquired a strong anti-IMF position, increased social services,
restructured the debt, and used his country’s vast oil reserves for the benefit of Ecuadorians,
instead of multinational corporations. The factors leading to the formation, sustainability, and
success of anti-neoliberal social movements will now be examined.
History of National Populism
Ecuador does not have as strong of a history of national populism as Argentina and
Bolivia. Due to regionalism, elite conflicts, political fragmentation, and commodity exportled economy, the central Ecuadorian state was not particularly strong, especially compared to
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Perón’s Argentina or Paz Estenssoro’s Bolivia. Due to the amount of elite control in the
government and the economy, the popular sector did not have power and did not achieve a
high degree of rights and representation. The landed elite, the Catholic Church, and large
landowners dominated both the urban and rural landscapes and prevented the growth of any
populist leaders throughout the first half of the 20th century. The only populist period in
Ecuadorian history took place during the mid 1960s and 1970s under various military
governments. Due to external influence from the UN and USAID, the military governments
enacted a variety of land reforms in the 1960s to replace traditional latifundista systems with
more productive farms and less exploitative labor relations.59 Throughout much of Ecuador’s
history, a small population of elites owned most of the land and many rural laborers, most of
whom were members of indigenous communities, were forced to work in slave-like
conditions on land that they did not own in order to survive. In 1964 and 1973, land reform
acts granted a large number of civil, economic, and social rights to urban and rural peasants
due to large revenues from the country’s oil reserves and the state’s desire to gain a strong
base of peasant supporters. 60 Land redistribution, an expansion in social services, and a
deeper awareness of the rights of the peasants characterized the military dictatorship.
Although these reforms may have only been enacted to gain more support among the
peasantry so that the state could have more power over the economy and natural resources, it
is an important period in the history of Ecuadorian indigenous mobilization. According to
Deborah Yashar (2005), “...throughout this period, the number of rural comunas, associations,
and cooperatives increased accordingly and developed a certain degree of autonomy from the
holy trinity that had regulated rural politics.”61 This period of national populism, although
brief and dominated by a military government, granted the popular sector many different
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rights through a variety of inclusionary policies. These organizations were the foundation for
collective mobilization and framing throughout the 1990s and 2000s.
Although the military governments empowered and represented the interests of
peasants, particularly rural indigenous groups, urban laborers did not get the same type of
preferential treatment. Therefore, Ecuador does not have a particularly strong history of
powerful labor unions gaining significant political power during the populist era. Unlike in
Argentina and Bolivia, labor unions were not major actors during anti-neoliberal social
movements because they did not receive the same empowerment under the military
governments.
Socioeconomic and Political Exclusionary Policies
Neoliberalism first came to Ecuador in the 1980s after a global decline in oil prices
and the Latin American Debt Crisis slowed the growth of the Ecuadorian economy. However,
unlike the other two countries, neoliberal policies were not enacted as rapidly or extensively
during this time period. Nonetheless, socioeconomic exclusionary policies still hurt the
popular sector and middle class. For example, a devaluation of the Ecuadorian currency that
led to wage reductions hurt both wage and salary earners and cuts to subsidies hurt
purchasing power and severely degraded the standards of living for peasants and people in
the informal labor sector.62 Along with these economic exclusionary policies, there were a
number of social exclusionary policies regarding the treatment of indigenous populations. As
mentioned above, the populist era greatly empowered the Ecuadorian indigenous community
through the granting of civil, economic, and social rights. However, neoliberal reforms were
particularly hard on rural indigenous communities as decreases in social spending and
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incomes prompted the communities to realize the still ongoing land inequalities. Some of
these social exclusionary policies included a lack of formal recognition of Ecuador as a
multiethnic population and a lack of equal rights to services or proper working conditions.63
Although neoliberalism was not as radical or extensive in the 1980s, it became much
more sweeping and intensive under President Sixto Durán (1992-1996) and the
socioeconomic policies cut much deeper into Ecuadorian society. Unlike previous presidents
who had enacted neoliberal reforms, Durán was much more aggressive and orthodox in his
implementation of economic stabilization policies. This program included trade liberalization,
further tariff reductions, widespread privatization, and land reform that greatly benefitted
wealthy landowners. These traditional neoliberal programs eliminated most subsidies to oil
and consumer goods, cuts to social services, and massive layoffs in the public sector due to
privatization.64 Although Durán lasted only until 1996, these exclusionary policies continued
throughout the rest of the 1990s and were exacerbated by a series of international and
domestic economic crises. As these policies affected more and more people, popular protests
became much more prevalent and violent. One of the most controversial and contested
economic exclusionary policies was the constant increase in fuel prices. Ecuador is one of the
biggest oil producers in the Western Hemisphere and these vast petroleum reserves provided
much of the revenue that the military governments used to enact popular populist policies in
the 1960s and 1970s. However, neoliberalism also dictated the privatization of state-run oil
companies. This privatization led to massive lay offs and sharp price increases in the 1990s.
Although cuts to social services and subsidies mainly affected the popular sector, the
extensive privatization of the oil industry hurt many skilled and middle class workers as well.
As economic exclusionary policies expanded to more sectors of society, the appeal of

86

contentious politics greatly increased. These exclusionary policies continued into the 2000s
as successive presidents attempted to enact neoliberal reforms, despite social movements
causing their resignation or overthrow.
The political exclusionary policies were nowhere near as intense in Ecuador as in
Argentina and Bolivia largely due to the power of the Ecuadorian Legislature, the opposition,
and the fragmentation of political parties. Nonetheless, these policies restricted the openness
of traditional political systems and prompted people to turn to contentious politics to address
their grievances. Throughout the neoliberal era, presidents used decrees to implement many
of their structural adjustment programs. However, in Ecuadorian politics, decrees could only
accomplish so much. Presidential decrees allowed the implementation of monetary and fiscal
policies but taxation and privatization required approval from the legislature.65 Since
neoliberal presidents had to deal with strong opposition in the legislature, often from
members of their own coalitions, certain reforms were difficult to execute. In fact, a series of
electoral reforms in 1994 made the political process more conducive to social movement
organizations, such as the CONAIE. These reforms eliminated the requirement of political
parties to register within at least 10 provinces and in all three of the most populous provinces,
and they allowed independent movements to compete for political office.66 These electoral
reforms made the formation of indigenous political parties and representatives possible and
were essential to the formation of the Pachakutik Movement, Ecuador’s first indigenous
political party. However, despite this appearance of political inclusion, the Pachakutik
Movement has often been accused of being politically coopted by mainstream political
parties and not representing the issues of its core constituents.67 This cooption came to a head
in the 2002 election when the Pachakutik Movement aligned itself with Colonel Lucio
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Gutiérrez, who was one of the participating military officials in the 2000 coup. Once
Gutiérrez was elected, he enacted neoliberal reforms and deepened the country’s relationship
with the IMF.68 Due to Pachakutik’s ties to Gutiérrez and his implementation of exclusionary
policies, many members of indigenous communities and CONAIE grew disillusioned with
formal political channels. Although contentious politics was always the primary method for
the CONAIE to gather support and voice grievances, the Pachakutik’s performance in
elections helped many indigenous organizations and anti-neoliberal actors realize that formal
politics was not the most effective way to achieve reform. Restriction and cooption were still
rampant in Ecuadorian political institutions and helped push people from supporting these
legitimate political channels to using contentious politics to voice their grievances with
neoliberalism.
Economic Crises
Ecuador experienced the negative effects of the various international crises of the
1990s, but the importance of oil to the economy and its vulnerability to fluctuations in the
global demand for oil often created or exacerbated existing economic crises. These crises
expanded socioeconomic exclusionary policies and made the central government more
dependent on international financial institutions. These economic crises “…reduced the
functional power of the state – it could offer neither economic growth nor employment. This
aggravated the chronic inability of presidents to forge policy coalitions in Congress.”69 They
destroyed the appeal of neoliberalism for many the popular sector but successive
governments continued to implement reforms. As these crises became more frequent in the
late 1990s, the state was further debilitated and people took to the streets more frequently.
Although every South American country suffered from the East Asian Financial Crisis of the
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late 1990s, Ecuador was hit particularly hard because of global declines in oil and bananas
prices and a severe El Niño period that destroyed many of their other export products.70
These crises led to maximum currency devaluation, drastic price hikes, the collapse of the
Ecuadorian banking sector, and further negotiations with the IMF and World Bank. However,
these attempts to soften the effects of economic crises could not prevent the worst economic
depression since the 1930s from hitting Ecuador in 1999. During this crisis, GDP drastically
shrank, unemployment in the informal sector rose close to 60%, and poverty increased to
68% of the total population and 91% in rural areas.71 According to Jennifer Collins:
The crisis was characterized by a complete loss of faith in virtually all of
Ecuador’s political institutions. Only 7% of those surveyed in a national
public poll, for example, expressed confidence in Congress, and by December
the President’s popularity rating was also down to 7%. As the economic crisis
worsened during 1999, people increasingly perceived that the government,
and in particular the President, as biased toward powerful banking interests to
the detriment of the majority of poor Ecuadorians.72
The economic crisis of 1999 was the impetus for the 2000 coup d’état in which a faction of
the military, CONAIE, and thousands of disgruntled Ecuadorians forced President Jamil
Mahuad out of office. Even the Ecuadorian military failed to protect the president as many
soldiers who were tasked with protecting government buildings simply allowed the protesters
to pass, or actually joined the coup.73 Similar to the economic crisis during the same time in
Argentina, this crisis revealed the vulnerabilities of neoliberalism and the true lack of
political capacity of the Ecuadorian government.
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Framing
Due to Ecuador’s history of weak national labor unions and strong indigenous
identity, indigenous organizations, most notably the CONAIE, were the principal social
movement organizers. However, only about 25% of the Ecuadorian population is a member
of an indigenous community. Therefore, forming horizontal brokerage ties among nonindigenous groups was essential to creating successful social movements against
neoliberalism. Although many of CONAIE’s grievances concerned indigenous cultural and
land rights, it incorporated other groups because it framed neoliberalism as a new form of
imperialism and stressed that the problems of the indigenous communities were the problems
of all Ecuadorians.
As mentioned above, national populism was instrumental to the formation of
collective indigenous identities and organizations in the 1960s and 1970s. Not only did many
of the populist policies grant them civil, economic, and social rights, but the populist era also
fostered dialogue between different communities and facilitated a future national indigenous
movement. However, as the neoliberal era began in the mid 1980s, the role of multinational
corporations threatened many indigenous communities, especially those who lived in the oilrich parts of the country. The CONAIE was formed in 1986 under the presidency of Febres
Cordero and combined two already existing indigenous organizations: the highland
indigenous organization, ECUARUNARI, and the lowland indigenous organization,
CONFENAIE.74 Even in its formation, CONAIE accomplished more than the indigenous
community of Bolivia. Even though Bolivia has a majority indigenous population, there was
always a tension and gap between highland and lowland indigenous communities that
prevented the formation of a strong national indigenous movement. The CONAIE
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accomplished a major framing task through the consolidation of the two major indigenous
organizations into one movement. According to Silva (2009), “Although the social and
cultural conditions of the highland and the Amazonian indigenous differed substantially, the
intertwining of land and cultural survival issues as key framing elements united them.”75
Despite these differences between the two groups, the CONAIE was a powerful and united
movement throughout much of the neoliberal era.
Although the first major example of CONAIE-led national collective action against
neoliberalism took place during the National Indigenous Uprising of 1990, CONAIE was
forming ties with various indigenous communities throughout the 1980s. Prior to this
national uprising, the CONAIE, ECUARUNARI, and the CONFENAIE formed strong
relationships with small and local indigenous organizations. One of the most common ways
of forming these relationships was through the provision of resources and knowledge to
communities fighting multinational oil companies. Many of these MNCs, most notably
Texaco, attempted to access previously untouched oil fields in the Amazonian region of
Ecuador through negotiations with the Ecuadorian government instead of with the indigenous
communities. The neoliberal Ecuadorian government was more than willing to accept this
foreign investment and often gave these companies very favorable contracts. The indigenous
communities often had little to no say in these contract negotiations. The larger indigenous
organizations had more political power and more resources at their disposal and formed ties
with international environmental groups, NGOs, and other indigenous organizations in the
region.76 CONAIE’s contribution to these local indigenous movements gained them a
number of supporters for their anti-neoliberal social movements in the 1990s.
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The National Indigenous Uprising of 1990 was the first national indigenous
movement in Ecuador’s history. Ten days of roadblocks, large demonstrations, and
occupations across the country protested the neoliberal reforms that most adversely affected
Ecuador’s indigenous population: land reform, high inflation, and government indifference.77
However, the Uprising was also a way for CONAIE to introduce itself to Ecuadorian politics.
These protests allowed CONAIE to share its agenda with the rest of Ecuador. This agenda
was a series of demands that focused on three different categories: ethnicity, citizenship, and
class.78 Although the Ecuadorian government did not award many political concessions, the
Uprising was the first national mobilization of indigenous communities and proved to be
valuable in the formation of an indigenous consciousness. It also showed the potential
disruptive power of Ecuador’s indigenous communities and that CONAIE could be a
significant social movement organizer.
Contentious politics was not the only way CONAIE attempted to fight neoliberal
reforms and build large coalitions; they also experienced some success using formal political
channels. However, social mobilization was still fundamental to these experiences. One
example of social movements converging with formal politics took place in 1994 in response
to the Agrarian Development Law. This neoliberal law would have taken away many land
rights from indigenous communities, benefited large corporations or landholders, and enacted
mass privatization throughout rural Ecuador.79 In response, CONAIE organized the 1994
“Mobilization for Life” which consisted of mass protests that demanded a repeal of this law
and a greater recognition of the rights of indigenous communities. These movements forced
the government to negotiate with CONAIE and reform the Agrarian Development Law to
represent the interests of the indigenous communities. Another example of CONAIE’s
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attempts to engage in the formal political process was the formation of the Pachakutik
Movement. This political party was a collaboration between CONAIE and the CMS,
Ecuador’s strongest urban labor union, which fielded candidates in local and national
elections. Although the Pachakutik Movement experienced moderate political successes, as
their candidates or coalitions achieved occasional victories due to the influence of Ecuador’s
indigenous communities, the party was also accused of being coopted by political elites and
not representing the issues of their constituents. Although these forays into formal politics
achieved some successes in the fight against neoliberalism, CONAIE and other indigenous
groups realized that formal political channels were not the appropriate way to enact
significant anti-neoliberal reforms.
Despite the limitations of these formal political processes, they also revealed to the
CONAIE the importance of forming horizontal brokerage ties with the major non-indigenous
popular sector groups in Ecuador. In order to accomplish significant anti-neoliberal reforms,
CONAIE had to form ties with the remaining 65% of the Ecuadorian population that was not
a member of an indigenous group. According to Silva (2009), “…the [CONAIE] leadership
understood that accomplishing those [anti-neoliberal] goals required going beyond relatively
narrow indigenous interests. The movement could accomplish its objectives only by linking
indigenous struggles with those of all Ecuadorians…”80 One of the major ways CONAIE
formed these horizontal brokerage links was through interactions with the CMS. Although
labor unions have been fairly weak in Ecuador’s history, the CMS was able to gain a
significant amount of power among urban workers in the mid 1990s. Through the formation
of Pachakutik, CMS and CONAIE formed strong ties that brought urban and rural workers
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together around a common cause. As these ties grew over time, CONAIE began to frame its
grievances in a more national sense. By the end of the 1990s:
Issue framing stressed the common threat the government’s sweeping neoliberal
reform package posed to all Ecuadorians not of the socioeconomic elite. Protestors
claimed neoliberalism favored an alliance of international economic interests and
their domestic allies at their expense. In short, neoliberal policies promoted starvation
and misery while entrenching foreign economic interests and domestic allies.81
Appealing to the effects of neoliberalism on the entire nation of Ecuador, CONAIE formed
strong horizontal linkages between the indigenous communities, urban laborers, and the
middle class. Between 1994 and 2006, mass nationwide social movements were frequent and
intense. They were instrumental to the resignation or impeachment of a number of Presidents,
including Abdalá Bucaram (1997), Jamil Mahuad (2000), and Lucio Gutiérrez (2005).
Moreover, they also played a significant role in the 2000 coup d’état. As mentioned above,
anti-neoliberal protestors stormed the Ecuadorian Congress and demanded government
reform. Although CONAIE and other anti-neoliberal social movement actors successfully
toppled the regimes of many neoliberal politicians, they were not successful in establishing a
truly anti-neoliberal president until 2006. Bucaram and Gutiérrez were elected on Ecuadorian
nationalism platforms that promised to decrease Ecuador’s dependence on foreign actors.82
However, economic crises, the power of international institutions, and political greed forced
these presidents to embrace neoliberalism.
After more than 20 years of neoliberal policies, the neoliberal era ended in 2006 with
the election of Rafael Correa. Thanks to the support of the popular sector and a campaign

94

based on severing ties with the IMF and the World Bank, Correa was elected with 57% of the
vote.83 Since taking office, he has utilized oil reserves for the benefit of Ecuador, joined
OPEC, helped form the Banco del Sur (South America’s response to the World Bank),
restructured the country’s foreign debt, and increased ties with other Latin American
countries and China. Although Correa has faced strong criticism and opposition from the US
and Ecuadorian elites (he successfully avoided an elite-led coup in 2010), he has fulfilled his
anti-neoliberal campaign promises and has better represented the interests of the popular
sector, still the majority of Ecuadorians. Correa will remain president until 2017.
Venezuela
Although social movements were crucial to the ousting of neoliberal presidents and
the implementation of socialist Hugo Chavez, these movements were much more highly
decentralized and uncoordinated. However, political and economic exclusionary policies
sparked these social movements; and framing, although not quite as evident, was crucial to
the sustainability of these movements. The violence and political instability of these social
movements eventually destroyed the power and support of neoliberal presidents and helped
elect one of the most outspoken anti-neoliberal politicians the world has ever seen.
History of National Populism
The one aspect that separates Venezuela from its South American neighbors is its vast
oil reserves, the largest in the Western Hemisphere. Oil has been both a gift and a curse for
Venezuelans since the 1920s. Between the 1940s and the 1980s, oil was used to form and
sustain one of the strongest populist states in the region. During this time, the government
had virtually all control over the oil fields and used the revenues to enact import substitution
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industrialization (ISI), which maintained an incredibly powerful and active state. The state
built extensive infrastructure, maintained an extensive social state, and employed a large
majority of Venezuelans. There was such a high worldwide demand for oil that the
government had enough money to enact these social policies to benefit the lower classes
without having to place too many taxes on the upper and middle classes.84 Moreover, there
were very few political strikes during this era because negotiation was the general way for
groups to air their grievances and strikes were only seen as a way to destabilize political
regimes. During this period of populism, many sectors of Venezuelan society benefited from
a strong central government, especially the popular sector. This history was essential to the
feelings of relative deprivation throughout the neoliberal era and served as a model that antineoliberal protesters hoped to emulate in the post-neoliberal era.
Socioeconomic and Political Exclusionary Policies
In the late 1980s, the dramatic decline in the demand for oil forced the Venezuelan
government to adopt neoliberal reforms to control a large fiscal debt and a devalued currency.
President Carlos Andres Perez (1989-1993) enacted a variety of IMF stabilization policies
under his economic plan, entitled the Great Turnaround. Although the Venezuelan people
suffered through a severe economic crisis in the 1980s prior to Perez’s presidency, the Great
Turnaround produced a variety of unprecedented socioeconomic exclusionary policies. Like
many other IMF-supported stabilization policies, the Great Turnaround called for cuts to
public services, the elimination of price controls, deregulation, mass privatization, and trade
liberalization.85 In the wake of these policies, the popular sectors and middle classes
experienced a rise in the prices of goods and services, a decrease in the real value of their
incomes and wages, and a decline in working conditions and standards of living. In a short
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time, the number of Venezuelans living in poverty went from a small minority to the majority
of the population.86 The Great Turnaround forced a large number of people into poverty and
fostered a large degree of discontent among the majority of the Venezuelan population.
These socioeconomic exclusionary policies helped form the grievances of the lower and
middle classes against the new neoliberal regime.
A second wave of socioeconomic exclusionary policies took place during the
presidency of Rafael Caldera (1994-1999) as another IMF supported stabilization plan
further exacerbated the precarious economic situation of the poorest Venezuelans. Despite
being elected on an anti-neoliberal campaign, Caldera was forced to enact policies that led to
drastic increases in gas prices, the abolition of foreign exchange controls, and further
privatization. In a country that was so dependent on petroleum subsidies and so many
citizens were state employees, these politics were particularly exclusionary. They eroded the
political base of Caldera and motivated millions of Venezuelans to take to the streets to
demand reform.
Along with these socioeconomic reforms, Perez also enacted a number of political
exclusionary policies to increase the power of the executive, make it easier to repress social
movements and decrease the power of unions. In order to maintain basic democratic
principles, Perez enacted many of his Great Turnaround policies through decree. His goal
was to restructure the state to separate politics from economic policy making.87 An increase
in the repressive power of the executive accompanied this increase in presidential power in
the economic realm. Social movements throughout the working class neighborhoods during
Perez’s regime enabled the president to liberally deploy police and military personnel to
working class neighborhoods at the first indication of mass mobilization, most notably during
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the Caracazo riots. This liberal deployment of the armed forces distanced the relationship
between the public and the president. The final political exclusionary policy was the
incorporation of formerly powerful labor unions. During the populist era, unions, especially
the CTV, were a crucial link between the government and the working class. They were
incredibly popular among the people and were the main way for the popular sector to voice
their grievances. However, after a lack of a strong response to the Great Turnaround or the
Caracazo, the CTV was accused of being coopted by the government and lost a large amount
of support among the popular sector.88 In the wake of political exclusionary policies,
Venezuelans realized that they had no institutional channels to influence policy and had to
resort to social movements and contentious politics to voice their grievances and force
changes.
Economic Crises
Due to its vast oil reserves and Perez and Caldera’s sweeping and rapid neoliberal
reforms, Venezuela was much more vulnerable to fluctuations in international commodity
prices and economic crises. Not only did Venezuela suffer from the same international
economic crises as the other South American countries examined, its economy also suffered
from decreases in international demand for oil. These economic crises exacerbated many of
the neoliberal exclusionary policies and weakened the power of the central government. The
most important economic crises to the weakening of the neoliberal state took place in 1994
and 1997. The combination of the Mexican Peso Crisis and a sharp decline in oil prices
forced then President Caldera to resort to the IMF for foreign aid. This resorting to the IMF
turned out to be one of the most substantial blows against neoliberalism. Caldera was initially
elected on an anti-neoliberal campaign and Venezuelans expected him to fulfill his promises
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once elected. When he did not, Venezuelans blamed international economic organizations
and the Venezuelan state.89 This crisis greatly weakened the power and legitimacy of
Caldera’s government and destroyed the appeal of neoliberalism among the Venezuelan
middle class and popular sector. Another sharp decline in oil prices fostered an economic
crisis in 1997. By this time, social movements were occurring on nearly a daily basis and
Caldera’s political support was at an all time low. The crisis forced Caldera to enact further
economic stabilization programs and weakened his political legitimacy.
Framing
Unlike the other countries examined, Venezuelan social movements did not
experience a large amount of associational collective action. Although social movements
were instrumental in the toppling of the neoliberal presidencies of Perez and Caldera, they
were not particularly organized. There were no piqueteros, urban subsistence movements,
coca grower federations, or powerful indigenous organizations. However, what these social
movements lacked in organization, they made up for in intensity, frequency, and spontaneity.
According to Silva (2009), “Decentralized, uncoordinated strikes, marches, demonstrations,
and disturbances, in which each group protested for its own specific grievances, occurred
almost daily.”90 Although national labor unions, such as the CTV, sporadically provided
resources and facilitated horizontal mobilization, the majority of social movements were not
particularly organized. For example, the notorious Caracazo took place only days after
Perez’s implementation of the Great Turnaround in response to increasing gas prices and
transportation costs. Despite the lack of an overarching social movement organization,
hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans of all classes rioted and looted over the span of a
week.
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While these movements were largely uncoordinated and spontaneous, they
incorporated many different members of Venezuelan society and the anger caused by
neoliberalism served as a sufficient framing mechanism. Since so many Venezuelans of such
different economic backgrounds were constantly protesting neoliberalism, the movements
acquired some degree of associational and collective power that had significant impact.91 The
policies of Perez and Caldera were the primary framing mechanisms and the ways in which
horizontal linkages were formed. These social movements helped force Congress to shorten
Perez’s term by six months and assisted in the electoral victory of Hugo Chavez in 1998. Due
to this lack of coordination and the strong power of the Venezuelan legislature, relative to
other South American countries, neoliberal politicians were generally ousted by legitimate
political means. Congressional actions or electoral defeats were the main ways neoliberal
politicians lost their power, as opposed to resignations or successful coup d’états. However,
the frequency, size, and intensity of social movements, despite their lack of coordination,
were essential to the ousting of these politicians.
In 1998, Hugo Chavez was elected president of Venezuela on the campaign promise
of a 21st century form of socialism. Central to Chavez’s policies were the use of the vast oil
reserves to benefit the poorest members of Venezuelan society. He used oil revenues to
increase social services, expand education and health services, and increase employment
among the popular sectors. He also enacted a variety of policies that have made Venezuela
into a more direct democracy and made popular sector grassroots organizing a fundamental
pillar of his organization. Throughout his administration, he was accused of being a dictator
because of his controversial relationship with the opposition and the private media. Despite
these accusations of totalitarianism, Chavez was one of the great motivators for other anti-
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neoliberal politicians in the region, such as Evo Morales, Rafael Correa, and the Kirchners.
He provided an alternative to neoliberalism and enabled other countries in the region to do
the same.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the anti-neoliberal social movements in four South
American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. It has argued that a
country’s history of national populism, the implementation of socioeconomic and political
exclusionary policies, international economic crises, and framing across different horizontal
groups is crucial to the formation, sustainability, and success of a social movement. In all
four of the countries examined, national populism led to the advancement of social, political,
and economic rights of the popular sector throughout the first half of the 20th century.
However, once these countries adopted neoliberal policies in the late 1980s, a variety of
socioeconomic exclusionary policies – such as privatization, a decrease in social services,
increasing poverty, and rising prices – alienated many members of the popular sector, and in
some cases the middle classes, from the formal economic system. Political exclusion policies
– such as an increase in the power of the executive and decreasing the role of political parties
and labor unions – compounded these economic policies, as they restricted the masses from
voicing their grievances through legitimate political channels and motivated them to turn to
social movements to achieve significant political reform. Finally, social movement
organizations – such as indigenous groups, community organizations, and labor unions –
transformed these demonstrations from regional or class specific protests to nationwide
movements that incorporate many different groups of people. The ability of these
organizations to form ties across multiple organizations and classes greatly determined the
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sustainability and success of these movements. In these four countries, social movements
were crucial to the election of anti-neoliberal politicians. These presidents have enacted a
variety of reforms to dampen the effects of neoliberalism, increase the power of the central
government, and improve the standard of living of the poorest members of their countries.
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Chapter 4
Chile and Peru: Where National Anti-Neoliberal Social Movements Failed
The last chapter examined the role of social movements in the ousting of neoliberal
presidents in favor of ones who were more dedicated to enacting more humane capitalist
policies in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. However, not all South American
countries experienced this high level of nationwide social movement organization that
achieved drastic political gains. Chile and Peru are two of these countries. Although they
experienced both the negatives and the positives of neoliberalism similar to other South
American countries, they did not experience as intense, frequent, or effective anti-neoliberal
social movements. There were examples of strong, violent, and disruptive social movements
during the neoliberal era in these countries, but they could not compare to the nationwide
movements of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. By looking at the four factors
covered in Chapter 3 (history of national populism, existence of socioeconomic and political
exclusionary policies, the effects of economic crises, and social movement organizations’
abilities to frame their grievances and form horizontal brokerage ties), this chapter will
attempt to explain why similar nationwide anti-neoliberal social movements were not as
successful in Chile and Peru. In Peru, totalitarian political exclusionary policies not only
prevented the popular sector from using formal political channels to voice their grievances,
but the policies also barred them from forming any type of social movement or collective
action. Due to these strict policies and a history full of ethnic and regional tensions, local
organizations were either unwilling or unable to form ties with one another and form national
movements. In Chile, Pinochet’s dictatorship responded to any possibility of collective action
with violence and used terror to prevent anyone from opposing his policies. After he left
office, drastic socioeconomic and political inclusion, along with a fear of a return to violence
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and the weakness of traditional social movement organizations, discouraged mass antineoliberal collective action because people felt that they could voice their grievances through
formal political channels as opposed to resorting to the streets.
Peru: From Dictatorship to Inclusionary Neoliberal Democracy
Like Chile, a dictatorship was responsible for the implementation of many of Peru’s
neoliberal reforms. Due to this lack of democracy, reforms were often implemented rapidly
with little consent, and any form of opposition was immediately silenced. However,
neoliberal policies were implemented with little national resistance both before and after
Alberto Fujimori’s time in power (1990-2000) so authoritarianism was a necessary but
insufficient explanation. The other primary explanation for the lack of successful nationwide
collective action was the fact that social movement organizations – such as labor unions,
shantytown organizations, and peasant unions – were unable to create strong relationships
with one another and frame their grievances against the government in a national setting.
History of National Populism
Peru has had two distinct periods of national populism in its history. The first, which
spanned from the 1920s to the 1940s, incorporated rural workers, students, and labor unions
into the political process while the second, which spanned from 1968-1975, helped these
groups form horizontal ties and strong social organizations. The Alianza Popular
Revolucionario Americano (APRA – American Revolutionary Popular Alliance) was one of
Latin America’s first populist political parties and incorporated many members of the
popular sector throughout the first half of the 20th century.1 The APRA had strong socialist
tendencies and incorporated many union members, students, and peasants into its political
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infrastructure, preventing the possibilities of strong oppositional social movements and
ensuring a solid electoral base for decades. The second period of national populism, which is
important to understanding the state of social movements during the neoliberal era, took
place under the military government of General Juan Velasco (1968-1975). Through an
intense ISI reform and a strong central state, Velasco increased the state enterprise from 1%
of GDP at the start of his regime to 20% by the end, nationalized many foreign firms,
expanded existing public companies, protected domestic industry, and expanded social
services.2 Along with these economic policies, Velasco also enacted radical land reforms that
largely benefited rural peasants and indigenous people. Similar to Ecuador, haciendas and
latifundistas dominated rural Peru throughout its history. Under this system, one individual or
family owned large tracts of land, and peasants and indigenous people were forced to work in
slave conditions on land that was not theirs in order to survive. In order to silence any elite
opposition and build a strong support network among the popular sector, which included the
vast majority of Peruvians, Velasco enacted a series of land reforms in 1969 that virtually
destroyed the land-owning elite and redistributed large tracts of land to indigenous people
and peasants.3 Although the amount of land that was actually redistributed to individuals and
families as opposed to associations is still disputed, the fact that the government was willing
to work for the majority of Peruvians at the expense of the elites is significant.
Along with these land and economic policies, Velasco’s populist government was
also important because of his associational and identity politics. Shortly after the 1969 land
reform, Velasco created SINAMOS (Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Nacional
– National System for Support of Social Mobilization) to unite labor unions, shantytown
organizations, and peasant unions and encourage mobilization and coordination among these
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groups.4 These three groups constituted a large portion of the Peruvian population, and
although participation in SINAMOS was generally high, it did not translate to a significant
national movement under Velasco or subsequent heads of state. One explanation for the lack
of national success of SINAMOS, especially as opposed to CONAIE in Ecuador or the Coca
Growers Federation in Bolivia, is because of the overwhelming degree of political
incorporation. According to Yashar (2005), “SINAMOS sought to mobilize various
organizations as a means of generating support for the government and channeling
participation into legal and state-sanctioned channels…While SINAMOS preached
participation, it was hierarchical, tied to the military government, and therefore as much
about control as about political mobilization.”5 Due to these ties to the military government,
SINAMOS did not enjoy the same amount of autonomy as other national movements.
Velasco’s identity politics are also important to understand future weaknesses of antineoliberal national social movements. His most significant identity policy was abandoning
the term Indian and replacing it with peasant.6 Although the word Indian and indigenous
have racial undertones in Peru, the country has the largest population of indigenous peoples
in Latin America.7 Moreover, the struggle over indigenous rights to land has been a central
part of Peruvian history since the Spanish Conquistadors first came to Peru in the 16th
century.8 Nonetheless, this action of rebranding indigenous peoples as peasants had a drastic
effect on the Peruvian population. Although it was meant to form horizontal brokerage ties
between the indigenous and other members of the popular sector, it largely impeded the
formation of a national indigenous organization. Despite these identity policies, Peru’s
history of national populism was similar to other countries in the region because it combined
a strong central state with policies that benefited workers and the popular sector. However,
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Velasco’s identity politics would also prove to have drastic consequences for the country’s
history of social movements.
Socioeconomic and Political Exclusionary Policies
One of the many differences between Peru and the four countries examined in the
previous chapters is that a totalitarian dictator was the head of state of Peru for much of the
neoliberal era. Although politicians in the other countries enacted a variety of political
exclusionary policies that either empowered the executive or weakened labor unions and
political parties, these countries were still democracies. Peru, under the leadership of
Fujimori, was not a democracy and he did not have to find loopholes or evasive political
maneuvers to enact his policies. The political exclusionary policies were so intense under
Fujimori that they could not even voice their grievances through social movements or
collective action, let alone formal political processes. Ironically, Fujimori’s election was an
example of the openness of Peru’s political institutions.9 He was elected as a relatively
unknown political outsider in 1990 after there was vast disapproval of former President Alan
García’s management of the country’s economy. Although he ran on a mildly populist
campaign, he enacted a series of draconian neoliberal policies within his first years in office
to deal with the country’s dire economic situation and improve the country’s relationship
with international financial institutions. These policies led to the widespread socioeconomic
exclusion of many members of the popular sector. However, his political policies were a key
determinant in the success of national anti-neoliberal social movements throughout his
presidency and in the years following.
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Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, much of Peru was in the midst of
widespread violence and political instability due to the insurgent actions of two armed
revolutionary groups: Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) and MRTA (Movimiento
Revolucionario de Túpac Amaru). These two groups, especially Shining Path, engaged in
open violent clashes with the Peruvian government throughout rural Peru and eventually
made it to the urban areas by the 1990s. Fujimori exploited this sense of insecurity and used
his close ties with the military to violently marginalize any potential Shining Path activities.
However, he also used these counterterrorism tactics to implement his economic policies,
silence any opposition, and prevent the spread of social movements. According to Silva
(2009), “Fujimori and his supporters used the extralegal authoritarian concentration of state
and military power to ram through a neoliberal structural adjustment program and to fight the
Shining Path and MRTA.”10 These policies included imprisoning or killing labor leaders in
the event of a demonstration or strike, imposing martial law on a vast proportion of the
country, and disbanding all political parties. Not only was there no way for Peruvians to
voice their grievances through legitimate political channels, but there was also no political
associational space. Although neoliberalism existed both before and after Fujimori, this lack
of political associational space made the formation of horizontal brokerage links impossible
and greatly impeded the ability of social movement organizations to effectively frame their
grievances to gain a large national following.
Another example of Fujimori’s repressive and totalitarian policies was his 1992 autogolpe, or self-coup. Peruvian political parties have historically been fragmented and
candidate-centered.11 This weakness of political institutions made it virtually impossible for
citizens to play an active role in the political system or for anyone to provide any sort of
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substantial opposition to Fujimori’s regime. Moreover, the fact that Fujimori was a political
outsider with essentially no political experience and a seemingly insurmountable
socioeconomic crisis meant that he would not be able to accomplish his goals via democracy.
According to Levistky and Cameron (2003), “A political amateur, he had no real party
behind him, no program ready for implementation, and no team to staff the government. His
supporters held less than a fifth of the seats in the congress…He was opposed, moreover, by
leading sectors of the political, economic, and religious establishment.”12 Since democracy
would have likely been the end of him, Fujimori turned to violence and totalitarianism in the
form of an autogolpe. On April 5, 1992, he dissolved the congress, purged the judiciary, and
severely censored the press. The combination of the autogolpe with the counterinsurgency
policies throughout Peru severely excluded the majority of those most affected by
neoliberalism.
In terms of socioeconomic exclusionary policies, the lower and working classes
suffered while the elites greatly benefited in the midst of drastic economic growth. The
international community lauded Fujimori for his economic stabilization programs that
produced unprecedented amounts of macroeconomic growth so recently after such a dire
economic crisis in the late 1980s. In fact many Peruvians to this day hold Fujimori in high
regard because of his ability to stabilize the country politically and economically.13 He
defeated Shining Path and oversaw a large degree of economic growth. However, similar to
Argentina, macroeconomic growth and the prosperity of the elite came at the expense of the
poor. By 1992, wages had lost 2/3 of their 1979 value, the minimum wage had plummeted,
prices of basic goods increased substantially, unemployment in the formal and employment
in the informal sectors both increased, and poverty was consistently above 50% nationwide.14
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These socioeconomic exclusionary policies were similar to the other countries examined, but
because of macroeconomic growth, the totalitarian power of Fujimori, and control of the
press made social movements impossible for the popular sector and undesirable for the
middle classes.
Framing
Although Fujimori closed virtually all political and social movement channels, his
presidency was not the only reason for the lack of a substantial national social movement
against neoliberalism. Both prior and after Fujimori’s presidency, social movement actors
were unable to frame their issues in a national setting incorporating themselves with each
other. Prior to Fujimori’s presidency, the most powerful example of anti-neoliberal collective
action was the Shining Path. During the 1980s, the Shining Path formed associational
collective power among peasants and shanty dwellers because of their anti-government
positions. However, its insurrectionary nature and inability to associate with other social
movement groups prevented it from forming horizontal linkages with other organizations or
even other Shining Path cells. Although there were violent aspects of all of the other social
movements analyzed, Peru is the only country examined with an overtly insurrectionary
guerilla movement. Due to this violence, it was easy for the state to violently repress them
without having to resort to democratic legitimation while also damaging the efficacy of its
message. Instead of being a social movement organization or a national movement, Shining
Path was labeled a “terrorist” group and delegitimized as a social force. Despite this
delegitimation, they still gained a significant amount of power in both the urban and rural
landscape. However, because of its violent nature and ideology of completely destroying the
Peruvian state, it did not look to make ties with other organizations. According to Silva
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(2009), Shining Path’s “…sectarianism, intolerance of reformism, and emphasis on armed
conflict and indiscriminate violence inhibited the development of an anti-neoliberal episode
of contention in Peru. These characteristics drove a wedge between the Shining Path and
other popular sector organization, ‘merely’ demanding reform of neoliberal capitalism.”15
The influence of the Shining Path and its inability to effectively frame themselves as
legitimate opposition to the government weakened the associational power of the social
movement organizations, even before Fujimori’s regime.
Even after Fujimori’s resignation, social movement organizations were unable to
form a significant national anti-neoliberal movement. Fujimori was forced to resign, but not
because of the strength of the opposition, civil society, or mass social movements. He was
forced to resign amidst corruption charges that had little to nothing to do with his neoliberal
policies. Therefore, although a neoliberal president was forced out of office in Peru, it was
not due to mass social mobilization. After his resignation, democracy and stability largely
returned but neoliberalism was not defeated. Fujimori’s regime had a profound effect on both
the social and political institutions of Peru. For example, Alejandro Toledo was elected
president in the aftermath of Fujimori’s resignation. He was elected on a populist, antineoliberal platform but, once in office, he continued to institutionalize IMF structural
adjustment programs.16 Although there were a variety of anti-neoliberal social movements
during this time due to the extensive socioeconomic exclusionary policies and the openness
of political and social institutions, these movements were largely regional in nature. During
this time, the indigenous identity became more of a point of pride and unity throughout Peru,
but it was largely divided between Amazonian indigenous communities and Andean
indigenous communities.17 Although Toledo’s administration even tried to forge horizontal
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linkage ties to the different organizations, a significant national indigenous movement has
still not formed in Peru. Bolivian indigenous communities faced these same tensions but they
were still able form a national anti-neoliberal movement. However, largely decentralized and
often politically incorporated regional movements and an overall fear of a return to violence
among the entire nation discouraged national anti-neoliberal movements.18 Fujimori’s most
important effect of Peruvian political parties was that he made them much more candidatecentric.19 Due to the fact that candidates are so important to political parties, these candidates
have to be well known among the various Peruvian communities. This closer relationship
between voters and candidates leads to more political incorporation and less of an inclination
to resort to social movements. Another explanation for a lack of national anti-neoliberal
social movements in post-Fujimori Peru is because of the violence of the Shining Path.
According to Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, nearly 70,000 Peruvians were
killed during Fujimori’s regime.20 Not only was Peru recovering from a totalitarian regime,
they were also recovering from mass atrocities. This period was a traumatic effect in Peru’s
history and transitional justice was more important than anti-neoliberal contention.21
Moreover, since Shining Path was the closest thing to a national anti-neoliberal movement,
many Peruvians were wary of a return to violence if another national movement arose.
Although Toledo’s neoliberal policies continued throughout his presidency and
neoliberal contention remained local, Alan García won his second presidential term in 2006
and preached neoliberalism with a human face. During his presidency, he was able to achieve
a certain degree of macroeconomic growth, approval from international financial institutions,
support from the middle class and the right wing; but he has also worked to alleviate poverty,
increase social spending, and work with instead of against Coca federations. Although his
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policies are still regarded as neoliberal, they have also attempted to incorporate the working
classes.22 Unlike Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, Peruvian heads of state have
not been as antagonistic to neoliberalism and the United States.
Chile
Chile was not only Latin America and the world’s first neoliberal experiment, it also
experienced a much longer and much more unique neoliberal era than many of the other
countries examined in this study. Similar to Peru, many of Chile’s neoliberal policies were
implemented under the rule of an authoritarian dictator. However, whereas Fujimori ruled
Peru for only about 10 years, Pinochet controlled Chile for nearly 15 years and was very
active in the government and economy for years after he ceased being president. The social
movements that existed during the Pinochet regime were often violently repressed and unable
to form brokerage ties with other movements. Although a plebiscite was responsible for the
peaceful transition of power to democracy, Pinochet’s fall did not lead to an end to
neoliberalism. Neoliberal policies continued after Chile’s redemocratization but there has
been a noticeable lack of national social movements against neoliberalism because of social
movements organizations’ lack framing mechanisms and an overwhelming degree of
socioeconomic and political inclusion under the Concert of Parties for Democracy coalition
that was in power in Chile from 1990-2010.
History of National Populism
Compared to the other countries examined, Chile’s history of national populism is
much less extensive and resonant today. Chile was the first South American country to
democratically elect an openly socialist president but the populist era was much less
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powerful in the country. Throughout the first half of the 21st century, Chile’s abundant
natural resources made its economy incredibly dependent on international actors, most
notably American multinational corporations. Although this dependence on international
actors is not different from other South American countries, the fact that the same type of
populist movement never emerged in Chile shows the extent of the role of the United States
in the Chilean economy. Nonetheless, there were still attempts to organize a populist
movement. For example, coalitions of socialists, communists, radicals, and leftists acquired
some political power under a populist platform in the 1940s. Due to the cessation of imports
after World War II, Chile was able to foster domestic industrialization, implement ISI, raise
employment in the state sector, increase wages and purchasing power, lower taxes, and
increase subsidies.23 However, this “populist” era “…produced no structural changes in the
Chilean economy or society. Chilean governments were unable to institute basic economic
and social reforms because the members of the coalition had irreconcilable differences over
domestic and foreign policy.”24 Further dependence on economic aid and investment from
the United States characterized Chile throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
Although not explicitly an example of a populist movement, Salvador Allende’s brief
presidency (1970-1973) is nonetheless important to the understanding of historical
incorporation of the popular sectors. In the modern day, many regard Allende as a strong
politician with a feasible way to democratically implement a nonviolent form of socialism to
benefit the majority of Chileans. Despite this image, Allende constantly faced strong
opposition from powerful actors, a working class with a variety of irreconcilable interests,
and a series of economic crises. Although Allende was democratically elected, he had to deal
with constant opposition from the elite classes, the judiciary, the media, multinational
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corporations, and the United States. According to Keen (2000), “…the Chilean oligarchy and
its North American allies were formidable, unrelenting opponents. Although the upper class
lost much of its economic base due to the nationalization of large industries and
expropriation of large land-holdings, it retained control over much of the mass media, the
judiciary, a majority in Congress, and the armed forces.”25 Along with covert and overt
threats from these powerful actors, Allende also had to confront a diverse working force.
Although Allende ran as a candidate of the working class, different members of the working
class had different demands. For example, copper miners, who earned higher wages, had
demands that were contradictory to natural gas miners and campesinos. Therefore, although
Allende had their support, he had difficulties mobilizing these sectors in the face of such
staunch opposition.26 This inability to mobilize his supporters, combined with an acute
economic crisis in 1972, culminating in a number of employers’ strikes. These strikes (which
were subsidized by the CIA) became national and forced Allende to make significant
concessions and abandon some of his socialist policies.27 This staunch opposition, lack of
unity and mobility among his supporters, and an economic crisis sufficiently weakened
Allende’s government that he could not prevent the September 11th, 1973 military coup.
Despite these limitations, many regard him as a heroic character to this day throughout Chile
and Latin America. During the first year of his presidency, inflation rates drastically
decreased, worker incomes rose, public spending increased, price controls were established,
standards of living increased, unemployment dropped, and the dormant economy became
more diversified.28 Even as late as the spring elections of 1973, Allende’s party’s vote rose to
44% from 36% in 1970.29 Many regard Allende as a president who was dedicated to fighting
for the Chilean working class and peasantry and not for the interests of the Chilean oligarchy
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and its North American allies. Although his presidency did not last long, it is still an
important period in Chile’s history. Nonetheless, because Chile did not have the same type of
populist movement as many other South American countries, the peasants and working class
did not have a set period to reference in the framing of their grievances against governments
during the anti-neoliberal period.
Socioeconomic and Political Exclusionary Policies
The exclusionary policies under the Pinochet regime, especially in his first few years
in office, included draconian economic stabilization policies and extensive human rights
violations. Similar to Fujimori, Pinochet used state-sponsored terrorism to close all formal
political channels to voice grievances but also to severely restrict any forms of associational
power in his first years in office. He wanted to make sure that his government was immune to
both political and social forms of opposition. Along with his close relationship to the armed
services, Pinochet also implemented a number of political exclusionary policies through the
creation of the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (Directorate of National Intelligence,
DINA). This intelligence organization made sure that any form of opposition was silenced,
arrested, and killed. According to Carlos Huneeus (2007), “The DINA battled left-wing
groups, opposition organizations, and Catholic Church bodies. Its members acted not only in
Chile but also abroad, creating a climate of terror among opposition groups and fear among
the regime’s supporters, and becoming a symbol of the military of the military’s regime’s
repressive character.”30 The DINA had the power to kidnap, arrest, and kill without
justification and were under no obligation to report their activities to any organization.
Moreover, agents of the DINA were not well known to the public so there was a constant
terror of the unknown. According to Chile’s National Commission for Truth and
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Reconciliation Report, nearly 3,000 people were killed for political reasons and thousands
more were imprisoned and tortured.31 Most of those killed were peasants, labor workers,
public employees, or students.32 Since so many people were detained, tortured, and killed for
simply expressing opposition views to the Pinochet regime, collective action was virtually
impossible, especially in the first few years of Pinochet’s regime when the violations were
particularly heinous. Similar to Fujimori’s Peru, Chile’s formal political and social
institutions were completely restricted. In other countries, the restriction of political channels
prompted people to resort to the social movement to voice their grievances. In Chile, social
movements were just as restricted as formal political channels because of the constant state
of fear.
Along with state-sponsored terrorism, Pinochet also implemented a variety of
political exclusionary policies that drastically restricted formal political institutions. As
mentioned early, Pinochet’s economic team, the Chicago Boys, were appointed and unknown
to the public and implemented a series of economic reforms without the public’s support.
Moreover, there was little to no transparency in his legal practices because he simply used
the military or the DINA to silence his opponents and did not need to rely on any sort of
legitimation for his actions during his first years in power. Along with these strong mantactics, Pinochet also enacted a variety of authoritarian reforms – such as a highly centralized
government, the dissolution of Congress, the stacking of the courts, the banishment of
political parties, and the purging of state institutions and universities.33 Throughout the first
few years of Pinochet’s reign, Chileans lived under a constant state of terror and had no
political rights. However, macroeconomic growth was unprecedented between 1977 and
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1981 and many were willing to live in a authoritarian society if it meant such economic
growth.
However, this economic growth did not last long into the 1980s and Pinochet enacted
a variety of political liberalization reforms in order to legitimize his presidency. The period
of Pinochet’s military regime was to correct the failure of Chilean democracy under Allende.
In order to found a new democracy, there needed to be a period of military rule to impose
order and create favorable conditions for a lasting democracy. In a speech that Pinochet gave
shortly after the coup in 1973, he said:
To rebuild is always slower and more arduous than to destroy. Because of this,
we know that our mission will not be as temporary as we would have liked,
and thus we provide no deadlines and set no dates. Only when the country has
achieved the social peace necessary for the true economic development and
progress to which it is entitled and Chile shows no faces with reflections of
hatred will our mission have ended.34
However, as economic crisis hit Chile in the 1980s, Pinochet became more politically liberal
and implemented a new Constitution and enacted a number of plebiscites. The Constitution
of 1980, which was approved by a plebiscite, did not grant significant political freedoms but
was still a drastic liberalization. In the wake of the constitution, political parties were not
explicitly legal but also were not quite illegal either.35 This liberalization opened up certain
avenues of political associational space and produced a number of movements against the
government in the wake of the Latin American debt crisis. However, despite these
liberalizations, the military still largely controlled the government and the media and the
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Constitution enacted a number of policies that greatly protected the interests of property
holders, making it nearly impossible to dismantle the market society.
Although the political exclusionary policies were more overt during the Pinochet
regime, socioeconomic exclusionary policies were still frequent. Pinochet’s draconian
neoliberal structural adjustment policy was called “The Brick” and involved a comprehensive
privatization and liberalization program. Some of these policies included market
liberalization, deregulation, public service layoffs, reduction in social spending, privatization,
tying domestic inflation to international trends, and few state subsidies.36 Similar to other
neoliberal policies in other countries, these policies led to rapid macroeconomic growth at the
expense of the working classes and popular sector. However, much of this growth was due
more to the terrible economic crisis Chile was in right before the coup as opposed to
Pinochet’s concrete policies. For the working classes and popular sector, wages dropped,
poverty increased, standards of living plummeted, and income inequality skyrocketed in the
first part of Pinochet’s regime. Despite political liberalizations, economic crises in the 1980s
exacerbated the already marginalized lives of Chile’s working class and the socioeconomic
exclusionary policies began to affect the Chilean middle classes as well. For example, in
1985, 49% of the population of greater Santiago lived in poverty and nearly 45% of the
Chilean population in total.37 Many of these exclusionary policies continued throughout the
1980s but Pinochet’s power prevented any substantial national movements during this time.
Framing
Although there was a certain degree of mass anti-neoliberal mobilization in the 1980s
in response to the severe economic crises after Pinochet implemented a variety of liberal
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political reforms, these movements’ achievements were limited due to the power of the
Pinochet regime. After Pinochet stepped down in 1989, the new government of the CPD was
able to continue enacting neoliberal policies throughout the 1990s and 2000s without facing
many significant mass mobilizations. They were able to achieve this balance due to the
historical power of political parties in Chile’s history, Chilean people’s fear of a return to
violence, and a fairly weak or decentralized collection of traditional social movement
organizations.
As mentioned above, Pinochet’s political liberalizations in the 1980s granted a certain
degree of political associational power to social movement organizers. Although there were a
number of social movements against neoliberalism and the Pinochet regime during this time
period, such as the labor movements of 1984, they were generally regionalized or specific to
one social movement organization. Through the use of institutional violence and terror,
Pinochet prevented the formation of significant horizontal linkages between different social
movement groups. Moreover, many of his economic policies had already severely limited the
power of labor unions and shantytown organizations. Another limitation of collective power
building during this time was the presence of violence. When peasants or workers protested,
they often did so violently and Chilean authorities responded with more violence. Even when
the protests were not violent, repression was the main tool of the Chilean government. For
example, Chilean officials burned alive two unarmed, nonthreatening youths in public in a
shantytown.38 This violence scared many of the middle class away from protesting with the
working class and eventually brought mobilization against Pinochet in the 1980s to a close.
Although the Chilean people were ultimately responsible for expelling Pinochet from power
through a plebiscite in 1988, this action was not the direct result of a national social
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movement. Moreover, Pinochet’s departure did not end Chilean neoliberalism, as it
continued throughout the new democratic period.
One of the major reasons for the survival of neoliberalism after the return of Chilean
democracy was the CPD’s policy of socioeconomic and political inclusion.39 The CPD
(Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia – Concert of Parties for Democracy) was the
political coalition that gained power after the return to democracy and held the presidency
until 2010. Throughout the CPD’s time in power, it has stressed neoliberalism along with
political inclusion. Chile, like many other Latin American countries, has a history of strong
political parties. They have typically formed strong relationships with labor unions,
shantytown organizations, and just normal civilians. These actors, who are typically the
leaders of social movement organizations, were incorporated into the formal political process
and social movements were not as appealing. Due to these actors’ strong role in the new
democracy, a more humane form of neoliberalism was implemented. “Successive
governments of the CPD consolidated a market economy and introduced or expanded
significant protection from the market for many Chileans who had suffered far more
profound socioeconomic exclusion during the dictatorship.”40 These policies included more
spending on welfare and higher taxes while maintaining privatization and capital
liberalization. Along with these economic inclusionary policies, the government also actively
addressed its authoritarian past. For example, they addressed the human rights violations of
the Pinochet regime in the 1991 National Truth and Reconciliation Report. Although
Pinochet was given the title “Senator for life” after he stepped down, the fact that the
government took a step toward uncovering the truth after the return to democracy is no minor
action. In the wake of Pinochet’s regime, many people were more concerned with holding the
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dictatorship accountable and returning the country to its strong democratic roots and
economic policies were not quite as important. Moreover, the CPD created a number of
government agencies to address the needs and grievances of a variety of social groups and
movements.41 Similar to SINAMOS in Peru, these organizations attempted to incorporate the
popular sector into the government so that people would turn to their government instead of
the streets in the case of frustration. Because the government became the primary social
movement organization in post-Pinochet Chile, social movement organizations were unable
to frame grievances against the government because people could do so directly with the
government.
Another explanation for a lack of framing in the post-Pinochet, neoliberal Chile was
because of the legacy of terror that Pinochet left. Similar to Peru, many Chileans did not want
to take to the streets during the CPD years because they feared that instability would lead to a
return to violence and totalitarianism. Although Pinochet was no longer in power in the
1990s, he was still a “Senator for life” and the armed forces, although weakened, still played
a strong role in Chilean politics. The ever-looming presence of these two actors throughout
the 1990s discouraged mass social movements because of this fear of the unknown.
Moreover, Chile was able to avoid the worst effects of the economic crises of the late 1990s
and the degree of inclusion in the government gave them hope that formal political channels
would be able to sufficiently represent their issues.
A final reason for the weakness of social movement organizations in the 1990s and
2000s was the weakness or regional nature of typical social movement organizations, such as
labor organizations and indigenous movements. Labor organizations were decimated during
the Pinochet dictatorship and, even though they were incorporated under the CPD, did not
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acquire more power with the return of democracy. Although labor organizations have
attempted to organize social movements demanding more workers’ rights, they have been
unable to form horizontal linkages with other organizations and attract participation from
other sectors of the population. According to Silva (2009), “The mechanisms for political,
socioeconomic, and postmodern movements’ inclusion have sufficed to maintain relative
social peace in the face of serious problems with Chile’s development model.”42 Another
kind of social movement organization that has played a large role in anti-neoliberal collective
action in South America has been indigenous organizations. In Chile, the Mapuche
movement is the closest resemblance to an indigenous national movement. However, the
population of indigenous people in Chile is much lower than that of Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Peru. Moreover, there are a variety of indigenous communities throughout Chile and they are
not particularly unified but have rather formed more regional movements and organizations.
These movements have focused on their individual grievances and have not really attempted
to form ties with other indigenous organizations or frame their land grievances in a larger
neoliberal context.43 Due to these regional over national commands and the fact that a
national indigenous identity is simply not as strong in Chile as in other South American
countries, the Mapuche movement has failed to become a national anti-neoliberal indigenous
movement.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined some of the reasons why national anti-neoliberal social
movements were largely nonexistent in Chile and Peru during the same time period that these
movements were overthrowing neoliberal politicians in neighboring countries. It has argued
that totalitarian governments and an inability of traditional social movement organizations to
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frame their grievances in a national context and forge horizontal brokerage ties prevented
social movements from becoming national or substantial. In Peru, the framing abilities of
social movement organizations were weak prior to the dictatorship of Alberto Fujimori and
those weaknesses were only exacerbated by severe political exclusionary policies. Even after
a return to democracy, national social movements did not appear, despite the maintenance of
neoliberal policies. A fear of a return to violence, a weakened social movement organization
apparatus, and the adoption of neoliberal policies with more of a social conscience can help
explain this lack of formative national social movements.
In Chile, the repressive dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet restricted all
political and social associational space so that the prospects of forming any sort of social
movement against his government was impossible during his first years in power. The
responses to neoliberalism in Chile and Argentina are often compared because they have
similar histories, demographics, and economies. Both countries also experienced
authoritarian military regimes in the late 1970s. However, Argentina returned to democracy
around 1983 while Chile suffered through the dictatorship of Pinochet until 1990. Therefore,
Argentina underwent most of its neoliberal reforms under a democratic government where
social movement activity was not as oppressed. Conversely, Chile underwent the brunt of
neoliberalism under Pinochet, where most forms of collective action were illegal until the
mid 1980s. Despite a political liberalization in his later years, national social movements
were still virtually impossible to form because of the control of the military over the
government and the seemingly omniscient DINA. Although Pinochet’s fall led to an increase
in democracy, neoliberal policies still continued. In the other countries examined, democracy
did not end political exclusion, as presidents would routinely find ways to circumvent the
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democratic process. These exclusionary policies pushed people into the streets. However,
because of a large degree of political incorporation and inclusion, along with a fear of a
return to violence and the weakness of national labor and indigenous organizations, national
social movements did not accompany the return to democracy.
Although Peru and Chile are two examples of countries that did not experience
national anti-neoliberal social movements that replaced free market politicians with blatantly
anti-neoliberal figures, they have still found ways to survive in the post-neoliberal era.
Neoliberal policies are still prevalent in both Peru and Chile but what differentiates these
policies from those under Fujimori and Pinochet is that these policies have more of a social
conscience. Social spending, poverty, standards of living, wages, and public sector
employment are all features that contemporary governments in these countries have had to
acknowledge. Although these heads of state have not been as outspoken against
neoliberalism or international institutions, they have also realized that the well being of the
popular sector is crucial to the well being of their nations. Another explanation for these
more humane neoliberal policies could be the aspect of timing. For example, democracy
returned to Peru in 2000. This year was the height of neoliberal social movements across
South America and Peruvian politicians may have realized that intense neoliberalism could
seriously jeopardize their prospects for ruling a stable country. Therefore, they saw the
importance of combining neoliberalism with certain social policies. Because they do not exist
in a vacuum, these new democracies recognized what was needed to keep the public on their
side. However, the fundamentals of free market neoliberalism still exist in these economies
to this day and the achievements of the working class and indigenous organizations have
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been limited compared to the achievements of Argentines, Bolivians, Ecuadorians, and
Venezuelans.
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Conclusion: The Anti-Neoliberal Project Today
This thesis has examined the causes of national social movements against
neoliberalism in a number of South American countries. After the hegemonic economic and
political ideology conquered most of Latin America and the world in the 1980s and 1990s, a
number of South American countries – especially Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela – experienced widespread and long-lasting social movements calling for
substantial economic and political reforms. In each of these countries, millions of citizens
took to the streets to protest socioeconomic and political exclusionary policies that have been
characteristic of the neoliberal project. In some cases, indigenous groups were the main
social movement organizers while labor unions were essential in other countries. Where
neither labor unions nor indigenous organizations were strong, community organizations or
networks based on different identities were crucial to the formation of collective action. In
these four countries, national social movements caused the resignation, overthrow, or
electoral defeat of multiple neoliberal presidents. They were also essential to the installation
of heads of state that were willing to challenge the hegemonic discourse in favor of a more
nationalistic and humane form of capitalism. However, not every South American country
experienced this kind of social movement. This paper has argued that four factors help
explain why national anti-neoliberal social movements were successful in some countries and
failed in others: a history of strong national populism, the implementation of socioeconomic
and political exclusionary policies under the mantra of neoliberalism, the existence of acute
economic crises that weakened the appeal of the neoliberal project, and the existence of
social movement organizers who framed their grievances in a national context and formed
horizontal linkages with other social movement organizations to create strong and sustainable
movements. They are all interrelated, especially since social movements do not happen in a
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vacuum. A history of national populism is necessary because it provided the popular sector
with an alternative ideology to the hegemonic neoliberal discourse and helped establish the
policies of the anti-neoliberal regimes. Socioeconomic exclusionary policies are necessary
because they formed the grievances of the popular sector against neoliberalism and the
governments in charge. Political exclusionary policies forced the popular sector and,
eventually the middle classes, to take to the streets to voice their grievances, as most formal
political channels were restricted. Economic crises forced people to see the inherent
weaknesses and flaws of neoliberalism and severely weakened the governmental capacity of
the neoliberal state. In many ways, these economic crises made people realize that
neoliberalism could and should have been overthrown. Finally, effective framing was
essential to mobilizing both people and resources and making these movements national and
sustainable.
Although Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela experienced successful
national anti-neoliberal social movements, a number of other South American countries did
not. Peru and Chile are among these countries. Peru did not experience national antineoliberal social movements in part because of a decade of totalitarian rule that virtually
silenced all attempts at collective action and also because of the incorporation of the popular
sector after the return to democracy. Chile did not have a significant history of national
populism and experienced a similarly repressive neoliberal dictatorship that closed all
political associational space. Moreover, once the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet ended, the
new democratic government continued to implement neoliberal policies but incorporated
much of the popular sector and enacted a number of social policies that benefited the lower
and middle classes.
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In the four countries examined that experienced successful national anti-neoliberal
social movements, a head of state that promised and fulfilled various anti-neoliberal reforms
was elected: Nestor Kirchner in Argentina in 2003; Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2005; Rafael
Correa in Ecuador in 2006; and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1999. Kirchner was president
until 2007 when his wife, Cristina Fernandez Kirchner, took over. Evo Morales and Rafael
Correa are still the heads of state of their respective countries and it appears that they will
remain in charge for the better part of this decade. Chávez served as the Venezuelan
President until his death on 5 March 2013. These five presidents have been some of the
world’s most polarizing figures of the past decade because of their policies that have
benefitted the working and middle classes of their countries, often at the expense of the elite
classes and foreign interests. Although their public approval ratings have been consistently
high, many of the executives have come under increasing domestic and international
criticism for their policies, especially in the wake of the recent international economic crisis.
Kirchnerismo in Argentina
After a severe economic crisis destabilized the country and caused the resignation of
multiple presidents, Argentina experienced some of the highest rates of economic and
political development during the first decade of the 2000s. Although Nestor Kirchner was
elected nearly two years after the worst of the crisis, he was elected during a time of great
instability and when there was still a large degree of discontent among the popular sector. In
order to help his country sustainably grow and prevent a return to the social movementcaused unrest, he enacted a variety of political and socioeconomic inclusionary policies. The
most well known of these policies was the reopening of human rights trials regarding crimes
against humanity committed during the military dictatorship (1976-1983).1 Although this
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action was not in direct response to the neoliberal era, it was widely popular among the
majority of Argentines. Another significant political inclusionary policy was the protection of
popular assemblies and the piqueteros. These groups were the most vocal and powerful
social movement organizers during the neoliberal era and Kirchner wanted to make sure that
they were protected and treated well so that they would not be tempted to reorganize against
him. This protection allowed the organizations to slowly fade in importance over time, and
eventually they ceased to be major social movement organizations.2 These are just a few
examples of political inclusionary policies that improved the relationship between the
government and the Argentine population and increased the popularity of Kirchner.
Along with these political inclusionary policies, Kirchner also implemented a number
of inclusionary socioeconomic policies aimed at decreasing poverty and income inequalities.
In a speech given shortly after his election in 2003, he discussed what was necessary to the
fulfillment of these goals:
It’s a matter of…allowing a new Argentina to be born with social progress,
where children can aspire to live better than their parents based on their own
efforts, capabilities, and work. To achieve this, we must promote active
policies that allow for development and economic growth in the country, new
job creation and a better and more just distribution of income. It is understood
that the state plays a main role in this.3
Many of Kirchner’s policies resembled Perón’s populist policies of the 1950s, especially the
nationalization of the airline and postal industries. Although elites and the international
community have criticized many of these policies, Argentina’s Human Development Index
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(HDI) score increased every year of Kirchner’s presidency and currently has the second
highest HDI score in Latin America.4 Along with this domestic economic growth, Kirchner
was also instrumental in strengthening Argentina’s ties with other Latin American countries
to reduce the region’s dependency on the US and the IMF for financial aid. Nestor Kirchner’s
wife, Cristina Fernandez, took over the presidency in 2007 and expanded many of Nestor’s
policies and the country’s growth continued.
Despite the many economic and political successes of the two Kirchner
administrations, mass social movements against Cristina’s policies have increased in
frequency over the past year. In the fall of 2012, two massive demonstrations against the
Kirchner government consumed Buenos Aires. Both movements, one in the middle of
September (13-S) and the other in early November (8-N), featured hundreds of thousands of
protesters calling for reforms to Kirchner’s policies.5 These movements had many of the
characteristics of the Arab Spring, as bloggers were some of the main social movement
organizers and much of the information regarding the movements were spread via social
media. Many different members of Argentine society attended these movements to voice
their displeasure over growing inflation rates, corruption within Kirchner’s administration,
increasing poverty, and an increasing sense of insecurity and violence in the streets.6
Although these protests were nationwide and well attended, they did not create the same
amount of social unrest as those in 2001 and Kirchner remains in power. These movements
show that the contemporary leftist form of Latin American politics is by no means perfect.
However, Kirchner’s response has shown that the Argentine government has a greater
capacity to address the grievances of its citizens without being forced to enact further
unpopular policies to satisfy the demands of outside actors.
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Cocaleros in Bolivia
In 2006, Evo Morales became the first indigenous president of Bolivia. The former leader of
the national coca growers federation was elected on a mandate of increasing the rights of
indigenous peoples and enacting policies that would make the country less dependent on the
international community for financial aid. Since taking office, Morales has nationalized a
number of industries, including the hydrocarbon industry, increased royalties on foreign
companies, enacted land reform focused on empowering peasants and indigenous
communities, and confronted the US and the IMF on multiple occasions.7 Due to an
incredibly close relationship with Hugo Chávez, Morales has been able to legalize coca
production and prevent many US proposed drug interdiction efforts without risking
international aid. This antagonistic relationship with the US and other western financial
institutions has prompted many outsiders to question the legitimacy of Morales’ government.
However, Morales’ approval ratings have remained consistently high throughout his tenure,
as was apparent in the public support for a new constitution in 2009 and his reelection with
more than 60% of the vote during that same year.8
Despite these high approval ratings, the Morales administration has come under
increasing domestic political pressure since his 2009 reelection. In late 2010, Morales
announced an end to natural gas subsidies that led to a drastic increase in fuel prices. Prices
increased by more than 80% as the government could no longer afford to pay for the
extensive subsidies.9 Hundreds of thousands of Bolivians took to the streets to protest these
measures in a fashion similar to the El Alto movements of the early 2000s. However,
Morales was able to quickly respond to these movements and enact a number of reforms to
dampen the effects of these subsidy cuts; the protests ended fairly quickly.10 There have been
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a number of other protests against Morales’ policies over the past few years, most of which
have had to do with economic or indigenous policies. Despite these protests and Bolivia
being one of the poorest South American countries, Morales remains in power and enjoys a
relatively high degree of popular support because of his emphasis on enacting policies that
benefit the majority of Bolivians.
A Sense of Stability in Ecuador
During the same year that Morales was elected president of Bolivia, Rafael Correa
was elected president of Ecuador on a similar anti-neoliberal mandate. Similarly to Kirchner
and Morales, Correa was elected amidst political instability and his policies were aimed at
stabilizing the country and ensuring that his presidency would not end in a similar fashion to
the neoliberal politicians that had preceded him. His campaign included severing ties with the
US and the IMF, increasing ties with Latin American trading partners, using the country’s oil
reserves to the benefit of Ecuadorians, and increasing revenue for the social sector.11 Since
taking office, Correa has restructured Ecuador’s foreign debt, helped found the South
American development bank, enacted various land reforms, convened constituent assemblies,
and reformed the country’s constitution.12 Many of these actions have improved the living
standards of Ecuadorians and incorporated the powerful indigenous organizations that were
so essential in the ouster of former presidents. According to Silva (2009), “Instead of
bringing governments down, for the most part Correa turned popular sector mobilization that
helped to elect him into a source of support against obstructionist traditional socioeconomic
elites defending their privileges.”13
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Despite the sweeping campaign promises and initial successes of Correa’s
administration, the Ecuadorian economy and political climate have taken serious hits since
the international economic crisis in 2009. Correa’s social programs, combined with a drop in
oil prices, pushed the economy into deeper debt and caused income inequality to increase
between 2006 and 2008.14 Along with these economic struggles, the political climate has also
had a high degree of instability. Correa has extensively used national referendums and
plebiscites to enact controversial reform. Although this style of politics can be characterized
as hyper democratic, it has also been criticized for allowing Correa to implement his policies
without having to deal with opposition from other political institutions.15 This political
instability came to a head on 30 September 2010 when members of the national police
attempted to overthrow Correa. Although the coup was unsuccessful, it demonstrated the
tensions still deeply embedded in Ecuadorian society. Correa has remained in power but the
attempted coup had a profound effect on his presidency and his network of supporters. For
example, CONAIE referred to Correa as a dictator and demanded his resignation in a letter
published shortly after the coup.16 Although the CONAIE is not as powerful today as it was
during the height of the neoliberal era, Correa’s loss of their support represents the limits of
anti-neoliberal governance.
Despite the flaws in Correa’s presidency, he remains one of the most popular South
American heads of state and the country’s economic and political institutions have stabilized
since the 2010 crisis. In 2013, Correa was elected to a third presidential term with nearly
60% of the vote.17 According to CNN Español, Correa had an 80% public approval rating in
2012, by far the highest in Latin America.18 Moreover, Ecuador’s HDI score is one of the
highest in Latin America and has been steadily increasing since 2009.19 Similar to the
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Kirchners and Morales, Correa has been an incredibly controversial leader. Constant
accusations of totalitarian tactics, widespread popular support, and economic stabilization has
characterized Correa’s regime. Despite a variety of high profile criticisms against his
administration, he has continued to implement nationalist policies aimed at benefiting the
popular sectors. These policies have gained him widespread support among these
constituents and allowed him to win three consecutive elections.
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela
The most well-known and controversial anti-neoliberal politician in South America
was Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez. The polarizing figure was elected president in 1999
and held that office until his death in March 2013. Antagonism with the west and Venezuelan
elites, policies aimed at benefitting the popular sector, and countless accusations of
totalitarian policies characterized Chávez’s presidency. Through widespread socioeconomic
and political inclusionary policies aided by the country’s vast oil reserves, Chavez cultivated
the support of the vast majority of Venezuelans living in poverty during his administration.
One of the most common ways Chávez used his popular support to his advantage was
through the popular mobilization of his supporters against his often violent and powerful
adversaries. During his presidency, Chávez won more elections than any other elected
official in the world.20 Since 2004, poverty has been cut by 70%, Venezuela has the lowest
degree of economic inequality in South America, and the Venezuelan economy grew by
5.5% in 2012.21 Although the consistently high global oil prices can partially explain these
economic developments, “…the creation of worker cooperatives, the expropriation of
companies occupied by workers, the implementation of price controls, the further
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expropriation of land, and the provision of health and educational services and subsidized
groceries…”22 were important political and socioeconomic inclusionary policies.
Despite these policies that benefited the popular sector, Chávez still faced large
amounts of international and domestic criticism and resistance. The most notable instance of
domestic resistance took place in 2002 in the form of an opposition-led coup attempt. This
manufactured coup included the Venezuelan oligarchy and members of the military; the CIA
and the Spanish government have also had alleged ties to this operation.23 These actors were
able to take control of the presidential palace, temporarily dissolved Chávez’s government,
arrested Chávez, and installed their own leader, all without the support of the people. In
response to these actions, the people of Venezuela and the portion of the armed forces that
did not betray Chávez mobilized to protect him and restore him back to power; they were
ultimately successful and Chávez returned to power within a few days.24 Along with this
coup, Chávez also had to deal with national strikes of energy workers in his first years in
office. However, both the coup and the strikes were unable to unseat Chávez from power due
to his strong relationship with the poor. Along with these domestic criticisms, Chávez also
experienced widespread international condemnation for violations of human rights and
destroying Venezuelan democracy. Multiple international human rights organizations
accused Chávez of silencing the opposition, arbitrarily imprisoning people, and using the
police or armed forces to execute his political policies. According to the Political Terror
Scale (PTS), Venezuela has a score of 3 out of 5, which means that “…there is extensive
political imprisonment…execution or other political murders and brutality may be common.
Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.”25 Despite these
domestic and international condemnations and instances of armed resistance, Chávez held
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high levels of political approval until his death of 2013 because of his ability to represent the
views of the nearly 80% of Venezuelans living in poverty and incorporate them into his
community organizations.26 During his presidency, these people not only supported him, but
they also defended him.
Conclusions
The current political and economic situations of the four countries that experienced
successful national anti-neoliberal social movements shows both the successes and failures of
the politicians who came to power in the wake of this era. Presidents in Argentina, Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Venezuela enacted a number of leftist reforms aimed at dismantling the
neoliberal power structure and increasing the state’s capacity to provide for its people. Many
of these policies were socioeconomic or political inclusionary policies that strengthened the
ties between the popular sector and the administration in power. After what the popular
sector accomplished during the late 1990s and early 2000s, these new presidents knew that
they risked further social discontent if they did not address popular sector grievances. In
order to represent the interests of the popular sectors, these presidents often have had to enact
policies that have antagonized American and western interests. Despite the large degrees of
popular support for these administrations, they have faced a number of obstacles since taking
power. Evo Morales and Cristina Kirchner have had to deal with a number of national social
movements against their policies while Rafael Correa and Hugo Chávez experienced overt
challenges to their authority in the form of attempted coups. However, in each instance, the
presidents remained in power largely due to socioeconomic and political inclusionary
policies. These policies incorporated the main social movement organizers into formal
political channels and prevented a return to mass mobilization.
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Social movements were essential to the overthrowing of neoliberalism throughout
South America. The popular sectors in each of these countries showed their governments that
they would face widespread social unrest and collective violence if they did not represent the
interests of the majority. This period of anti-neoliberal social movements is important for
developing countries around the world not only because it represented a way to challenge the
existing international hegemons, but also because it showed the risks the governments of
these countries faced if they put the interests of international economic interests over the
interests of their people. Since the fall of these presidents, these countries have experienced
economic growth and the standard of living for the most impoverished has drastically
increased.27 Although these governments have not been flawless, they have done a better job
listening to their people because they fear that if they do not listen to their citizens, instability
may return. As neoliberalism has faced increasing challenges around the world in the wake
of the international economic crises and the collapse of many European economies, the study
of social movements can provide valuable insights into the possible future of the global
neoliberal project.
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